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INTRODUCTION
Ms. Amy Skilbred made her living as a wildlife biologist. She
regularly has traveled outside of the United States to study wildlife.
She visited Sri Lanka specifically to observe and study various
endangered species, such as the Asian elephant. Ms. Skilbred had
a "fixed intention to return to" Sri Lanka for vocational purposes,'
although the timing of her return depended, in part, on the
cessation of the Sri Lankan Civil War.2 When it became clear that
construction projects in Sri Lanka, funded, in part, by American
agencies, threatened to destroy the habitat of the Asian elephant,'
Defenders of Wildlife, an environmental group to which Ms.
Skilbred belonged, brought suit. Defenders sought to preserve the
species that Ms. Skilbred studied and planned to continue studying
through an order requiring the Secretary of the Interior to restore
an initial interpretation of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act of 1973' which had extended the geographic scope of the Act's
protection of endangered species to actions taken by American
agencies in foreign nations. Defenders alleged an injury to Ms.
Skilbred in the form of a detriment to her studies and to the
enjoyment that she derived from observing the Asian elephant.5
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Did she possess the required level of personal interest that would
justify giving her and Defenders access to the federal judicial
system?
It has become virtually obligatory to begin an article related to
the doctrine of standing by criticizing the Supreme Court's
treatment of the topic.6 The Court itself has admitted on occasion
that "the concept of 'Art[icle] III standing' has not been defined
with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this
Court which have discussed it."'
Essentially, the standing inquiry focuses on "whether the litigant
is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues."8 Standing does not focus on the merits but is
rather "a preliminary jurisdictional requirement" necessary to
establish that a litigant is entitled to judicial action.' Consequently,
the courts must define a consistent notion of standing that does not
erroneously deprive litigants ofjudicial recourse but does preclude
frivolous lawsuits.
The need to address the issue of standing is a relatively recent
phenomenon. The term "does not appear to have been commonly
used until the middle of our own century."" The emergence of
6 See e.g., 4 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 342 (2d
ed. 1983) (describing standinglaw as "permeated with sophistry"); Abram Chayes, The
Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARv. L. REV. 4, 23 (1982) (noting that after pretending to apply a consistent
standing analysis, the Court ignores the doctrine and "chooses up sides and decides
the case"); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221,290 (1988)
("[T]he Supreme Court has failed to articulate an intellectual framework that can
satisfactorily explain the results in cases already decided, or that can be usefully
employed to shape legal analysis in cases yet to come."); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 68 (1984) ("In perhaps no other area of
constitutional law has scholarly commentary been so uniformly critical." (footnote
omitted)).
' Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). Circuit courts have also had difficulty in
finding a consistent standard. See O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1982)
("[T]he doctrine remains opaque and does not admit of easy application." (footnote
omitted)); McKay v. Heyison, 614 F.2d 899, 903 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that "the law
of standing has often been confusing").
8 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also DAVIS, supra note 6, § 24:2,
at 212 ("The standing question is a simple one: Who may litigate?"); Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) ("[Standing] is an answer to the very first question that is
sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of another's actions: 'What's it
to you?'").
' Fletcher, supra note 6, at 223.
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the standing doctrine coincided with the vast extension of govern-
ment protections offered to private citizens,1' and the consequent
need to define which claims against government inaction should
properly be heard in the federal courts. 2
The Supreme Court's latest venture into the law of standing is
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.' In Lujan, Defenders of Wildlife
sued the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that he erroneously
applied section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act14 by promul-
gating a regulation that limited the scope of section 7 to those
actions that are in the United States. 5 The Act, which requires
federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior as to
possible adverse effects of agency action on endangered species,'
6
was previously interpreted by the Secretary to apply not merely to
the United States but to foreign nations as well.' 7 The plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment that the new regulation's limitation
(1978) (discussing the etymology of the term "standing").
" See Chayes, supra note 6, at 9 ("As Congress and administrative agencies
extended protection to a broad array of... interests, lawsuits involving the validity
of governmental action or inaction, rather than asserting private civil rights, have
come to dominate federal civil dockets.... ."); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1725 (1975) ("The growth of
governmental activity has made ... common law liberty and property rights an
inadequate measure of the private interests entitled to seekjudicial intervention....
The perceived need to protect new classes of private interests ... has produced a
responsive expansion of standing rights.").
12 See 13 CHARLES A. WpiGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531,
at 340-41 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that "[standing] has been very much tied to litigation
asserting the illegality of governmental action" since in classical private lawsuits,
standing is self-evident: "[c]laims of private wrongdoing.., are asserted by persons
obviously having the enforceable interest").
13 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
14 The section provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance
of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out
by such agency... is not likely tojeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species ....
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
'5 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1992).
16 Consultation is a procedural requirement of the Endangered Species Act which
insures that agency action "is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species." 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (1988). The Secretary and the federal
agency together consider the impact of agency action on an endangered species. See
id.; see also Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2158 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Consultation is
designed as an integral check on federal agency action, ensuring that such action does
not go forward without full consideration of its effects on listed species.").
17 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2135.
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of the scope of the Act to the United States was in error.'8 They
also sought "an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a
new rule restoring [the Secretary's] initial interpretation" that the
geographic scope extended to foreign nations." The plaintiffs
claimed injuries in the form of a lost vocational interest on behalf
of their member, Ms. Skilbred (and a few other similarly situated
plaintiffs), due to the impending extinction of an endangered
species.2 ' The Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing.
2 1
The Court currently draws its standing requirements from two
types of considerations-constitutional and prudential. Constitution-
ally, "a plaintiff can have standing only if he satisfies the 'case or
controversy' requirement of Article III. " 22 Once a plaintiff satisfies
Article III, she must then satisfy prudential concerns, which "arise
from a perceived institutional need for judicial self-restraint rather
than from the Constitution itself."21 While it may seem relatively
easy to distinguish between constitutional and prudential concerns,
courts often demonstrate "confusion as to whether the... standing
bar is constitutional, or instead prudential."
24
If a court can deny access to a litigant by either a constitutional
limitation or a prudential limitation, one may wonder why, beyond
formalistic concerns, it matters which limitation a court uses. It
matters, however, because the courts have less flexibility when
dealing with constitutional limitations as opposed to prudential
limitations. With respect to constitutional considerations, neither
the courts nor Congress can "create standing in cases in which




20 See id. at 2138.
21 See id. at 2146.
2 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 222 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973)).
23 David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis,
1984 Wis. L. REv. 37, 46.
24 City of S. Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 625
F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039 (1980).
2 Chayes, supra note 6, at 23 (footnote omitted); see also Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (noting that Congress can only extend
standing to the full limits of Article III); DAVIS, supra note 6, § 24:5, at 225 (noting
that the Court's position is that "Congress lacks power to confer standing on 'any
person' unless the person shows injury"); Fletcher, supra note 6, at 222 (explaining
that standing may only be statutorily conferred "[a]ssuming that Article III has
been satisfied"); Jonathan Poisner, Comment, Environmental Values and Judicial
Review After Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theosy of Standing, 18
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controversy requirement of Article III, she may not be granted
standing under any circumstances. The prudential limitations,
however, are "subject to elimination by the Court or by Con-
gress."26 As for the courts, since prudential limitations are not
constitutionally imposed, "a court has discretion on the question of
whether to apply a prudential standing limit."2 7 While courts will
generally adhere to prudential limits, they can "still grant[] standing
to plaintiffs in exceptional circumstances." 28  Congress too has
discretion to override prudential limitations.29 It can "confer
standing by statute when ... a plaintiff would have been denied
standing on prudential grounds."
30
Therefore, when a court identifies a limitation as constitutional
which the court should have identified as prudential, the court
actually prevents future courts and Congress from considering
situations where the prudential concerns might be outweighed by
countervailing considerations. Consequently, litigants who might
otherwise satisfy both constitutional and prudential requirements
are unnecessarily excluded from court.
ECOLOGY L.Q. 335, 353 (1991) (noting that Congress "may not expand jurisdiction
beyond the article M limitations" (footnote omitted)).
26 Scalia, supra note 8, at 885.
2 Ellen J. Bullock, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing's
Criteria Should Not Be Incorporated into Intervention of Right, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv.
605, 614 (footnote omitted); see also Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th
Cir. 1984) ("Prudential principles do not constitute 'limitation[s] on judicial power
.... '" (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982))).
2 Bullock, supra note 27, at 614; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01
(1975) (noting that the Court's "usual reluctance to exert judicial power" in the
presence of prudential considerations may be outweighed by countervailing
considerations).
' See Bullock, supra note 27, at 615 ("Standing's prudential limits are not only
within the discretion of the Court, but are also within the discretion of Con-
gress."); Chayes, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that Congress can "override" pruden-
tial limitations).
-o Fletcher, supra note 6, at 222-23. Consequently, if Congress explicitly
confers standing to overcome prudential limits, "then the Court's 'prudential'
hesitation is [automatically] overcome." Id. at 252. Congress can "expand
standing to the full extent permitted by Art[icle] M, thus permitting litigation by
one 'who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.'" Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S.
at 501). Therefore, an explicit grant of standing by Congress, such as a citizen-suit
provision of a statute, is a "legislative overruling of all (judicial] prudential
standing limitations." Bullock, supra note 27, at 615. Absent such an explicit
congressional grant of standing, courts have discretion in deciding whether or not
to apply prudential limits.
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A numerical hypothetical may best elucidate the grave ramifica-
tions of confounding prudential factors with constitutional ones.
Assume that the constitutional minimum for standing is arbitrarily
labelled as fifty. A litigant possessing a constitutional level of sixty
would satisfy Article III. A court could still prevent a litigant from
obtaining judicial access if the litigant implicated a prudential
concern. Problems arise, however, when the Supreme Court denies
access to a litigant on constitutional grounds when, in reality, the
Court should be limiting access due to prudential concerns. The
result is that the constitutional minimum has been increased from
its previous level of fifty to the new level of sixty. Future courts and
Congress, which lack the discretion to override constitutional limits,
must then deny standing to future plaintiffs who do not satisfy the
increased constitutional minimum. This denial is particularly
problematic when the future plaintiffs both satisfy the original
constitutional minimum and do not implicate any of the previous
prudential worries which motivated the Supreme Court to deny
standing to the original plaintiff. Nonetheless, such a litigant would
be denied judicial access."1
This Comment examines the relationship between constitutional
and prudential requirements for standing. While the Court in
Lujan seems to think it can discern the relationship between
constitutional and prudential requirements, 2 in reality the Court
raises the confusion to an unprecedented level. This Comment
shows how the Supreme Court has traditionally combined the two
limitations, harming litigants who deserve judicial access, and it
demonstrates how a clear separation of the two limitations would
allow litigants to gain judicial access. Part I explores the Court's
traditional three-pronged constitutional analysis. Part II shows how
the Court imported what should be prudential limitations into the
supposedly constitutional analysis and illustrates how Lujan has
done so to an extent never before seen. Finally, Part III explores
the negative consequences of such importation and shows how
separately identifying each limitation would eliminate these
consequences.
51 For examples of cases where lower courts are constrained by the Supreme
Court's confusion of constitutional and what should be prudential concerns, see infra
notes 395-491 and accompanying text.
32 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (explaining that "the core component of standing
is... the case-or-controversy requirement," while a smaller part of the analysis is the
"mere[] prudential considerations").
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. What Makes a Concern Constitutional
While the courts and Congress may weigh countervailing
considerations to overrule prudential limitations, neither branch
may override constitutional limitations under any circumstances.
Therefore, the Article Ill limitation on standing should be based
upon concerns that manifest themselves in every situation and
cannot be diminished by countervailing factors.
There are several justifications proposed for the doctrine of
standing, such as the assurance of truly adverse litigants, federalism,
or separation of powers." Consider the importance of the first
rationale: the assurance of adverse litigants. Article III always
demands that the "litigants could be relied upon to satisfy the needs
of a tribunal accustomed to deciding disputes as a result of
adversary litigation ... ."" The judicial system cannot function
properly without a minimum degree of zealous advocacy from
adverse participants, and there can be no countervailing exceptions
to this requirement. The presence of zealous advocacy "assure[s]
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult" questions.8 5 By requiring a vigorous adversary contest,
standing serves the purpose of assuring a clear presentation of the
issues so that a court can make an informed decision on the merits
and produce logical precedent. The requirement of zealous
advocacy "tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating
society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." 6 Further-
more, "a court may decide the case with some confidence that its
decision will not pave the way for lawsuits which have some, but not
all, of the facts of the case ....- 37
" Commentators typically focus on these threejustifications. See Fletcher, supra
note 6, at 222 (adversity of litigants); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing. A
Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 649 (1985) (federalism); id.
(separation of powers). This Comment also considers the seldom articulated
justifications of internationalism and military deference.
, WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 3531.1, at 362.
s Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
s Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
71 Id.
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Although "the Framers gave almost no indication of what the
[Article III case or controversy requirement] meant," 8 the major
concern "with the functional needs of effective adversary presenta-
tion has become" the core of Article III analysis."s The Court's
constitutional requirement "focuses on the desired end of concrete
adversity."40
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recently developed three-
pronged Article III test4 provides a further piece of evidence that
the constitutional barrier to standing is rooted in the promotion of
zealous advocacy. The Court has established that for a plaintiff to
satisfy the Article III standing requirement, she must pass a three-
pronged test: "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in
fact'.... Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of.... Third, it must be 'likely'
... that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'"42
Each element of the three-pronged test directly produces zealous
advocacy. First, one can see a correlation between the zealousness
of the advocacy and the degree of the injury. It seems more likely
that an injured litigant will have a greater incentive than an
uninjured litigant to put forth her best case.41 Second, a correla-
tion exists between the rigor of the issue presentation and the
degree to which the defendant caused the injury. A plaintiff is
' Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,Justice Scalia, Standing and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141,1150 (1993) (quotingJames Madison's circular assertion that tribunals deal
with matters "of aJudidary nature" in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
59 WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 3531.1, at 363.
0 Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1698, 1706 (1980).
' See Teresa W. Roseborough, Allen v. Wright: Standing Beyond the Bounds of
Article III, 63 N.C. L. REv. 1015, 1019 n.32 (1985) ("The Supreme Court's standing
test is intended to determine whether the issue before the Court is presented in the
context of an [Article III] case or controversy.").
4 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested
relief."); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (outlining a similar test).
Commentators have challenged the appropriateness of the existence of various
prongs of this three-pronged test. See e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW § 3-18, at 131 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that "an autonomous causation
requirement need not be a desirable part of" the standing question). This Comment
does not address the merits of the existence of the prongs themselves. Instead,
assuming the propriety of the existence of the various prongs, the Comment argues
that the Supreme Court has consistently manipulated the prongs.
4 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (requiring plaintiffs to have suffered enough injury
to assure proper issue presentation).
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much more likely to have the incentive to bring a zealous case
against a defendant who actually caused the injury. 4' Finally, the
redressability requirement also furthers effective adversarial
presentation. It follows logically that the plaintiff has greater
incentive to bring forth a strong suit when her injury is redres-
sable. 5 The Court has established its three-pronged constitutional
test in order to guarantee itself "an actual factual setting" in which
to decide cases.
4 6
For these reasons, the constitutional justification for standing
should be based in the assurance of zealous advocacy. Conversely,
the other possible justifications, such as separation of powers,
federalism, military deference, and internationalism, should not be
rooted in the Article III limitations.
Consider the separation of powers concern. Several sources
explicitly link Article III limitations on standing and the separation
of powers. This concern, however, should be rooted in the
prudential analysis and should remain quite distinct from the
constitutional limitation. Many cases and a plethora of commenta-
"See Tushnet, supra note 40, at 1707 n.36 (explaining that the causation "require-
ment does no more than restate the personal stake requirement, for without such a
causal relationship, it is unclear that a remedy will benefit the plaintiff; therefore he
has no [incentive to bring] the case").
"' See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohifeldian
orldeologicalPlaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1037 (1968) ("[U]nless the plaintiff is
a person whose legal position will be affected by the court'sjudgment, he cannot be
relied on to present a serious, thorough, and complete argument.").
"Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. One apparent problem with the three-pronged
test is that it appears to be both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in its assurance of
zealous advocacy. It is over-inclusive in the case of an impoverished plaintiff who has
suffered a constitutionally adequate injury but who does not have the money to
obtain the legal counsel necessary to produce effective advocacy. Such a person will
be allowed into court despite an inability to bring forth a zealous case. Alternatively,
the test is under-inclusive in the case of a wealthy plaintiff who has suffered no injury
but can afford to pay for counsel who can zealously argue the case. Such a person
will be denied standing despite the ability to zealously argue a case. This under-
inclusivity and over-inclusivity do not seem to be problematic. Certainly the Article
III constraints on standing were not designed to favor wealthy litigants over poor
litigants. While the Court's three-pronged test may not have a perfect correlation to
zealous advocacy, it misses this perfection only by rejecting a system ofjudicial access
based upon wealth.
" See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[S]tanding is built on a single
basic idea-the idea of separation of powers."); id. at 761 n.26 (noting that the
components of Article III are to be interpreted in light of "separation of powers
principles"); 13 WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 3531.1, at 363 (noting the recent trend of
including separation of powers in the Article III analysis); Scalia, supra note 8
(entitling his article The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers).
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tors have explicitly criticized the linkage between Article III and
separation of powers.4 8 If separation of powers concerns are not
distinguished from the Article III calculus, both the courts and
Congress will be harmed. As for harm to the courts, one need look
no further than the Supreme Court's recently developed three-
pronged test of constitutionality4 9 to understand why courts will be
harmed if separation of powers are not isolated from the constitu-
tional analysis of standing. When a court wants to deny standing
due to the supposedly constitutional worry of separation of powers,
it must link the denial of standing to one of the three prongs of the
Supreme Court's Article III test.
The problem is that there is a bad fit between the three
requirements and separation of powers.5" Consider, for example,
the constitutional requirement of redressability. "Redressability asks
only whether the judiciary can construct a useful remedy, not how
favorably that remedy compares with cures that could be fashioned
by another branch."5 Although an injury is clearly redressable by
the judiciary, it is still possible that another branch would be better
equipped to fashion a remedy. "[R]edressability is irrelevant to
separation of powers."52
48 Both the majority and the minority in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), have
criticized the constitutional linkage to separation of powers in a standing context.
Compare id. at 100 ("The question [of standing] does not, by its own force, raise
separation of powers problems ... .") with id. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that even though certain actions "might well alter the allocation of
authority among the three branches of the Federal Government," such actions are
"within the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts"); see also Steven M.
Kahaner, Separation of Powers and the StandingDoctrine: The Unwarranted Use ofjudicial
Restraint, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1074, 1076 (1988) (noting that the inclusion of
separation of powers concerns into Article III "effectively preclude[s] legitimate
claims from being addressed"); Logan, supra note 23, at 82 (arguing that prudential
limits are the "preferable ground for decision" when considering separation of
powers); Nichol,supra note 33, at 642 (explaining how separation of powers principles
are at odds with Article III); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DuKE L.J. 1170, 1187-88
(1993) (noting that inclusion of separation of powers concerns into Article III is
unfortunate because it illustrates how the Court is not concerned with the proper
standing questions); Poisner, supra note 25 (arguing that Article III standing is an
inappropriate way to achieve the goals of separation of powers).
49 See supra text accompanying note 42 (giving the three-pronged test).
o SeeRoseborough, supra note 41, at 1029 ("The separation-of-powers analysis...
fails to support the ... conclusion that the Article III standing requirements were not
satisfied.").
" Nichol, supra note 33, at 647 n.63.5 2 Id. at 647.
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Consequently, when courts link separation of powers to the
constitutional inquiry, distortion and confusion arise. Again, a
numerical hypothetical best elucidates the distortion that can occur.
Assume that the redressability requirement is arbitrarily labelled as
fifty. A litigant possessing redressability of sixty will easily satisfy
constitutional muster. A court may still wish to prevent this litigant
from obtaining judicial access due to a separation of powers
concern. Even though the judiciary can adequately redress the
litigant's injury, as is demonstrated by the litigant's redressability of
sixty, the court may feel that the remedy may be more appropriately
fashioned by another branch. For example, it may feel that the
executive branch may be the more suitable choice." When the
Court denies standing on a constitutional basis, it must point to one
of three prongs. By identifying a specific prong, such as redres-
sability,54 as the reason for the denial of standing, even though the
litigant surpassed the previous redressability level of fifty by ten
points, the Court has increased redressability to sixty. This increase
becomes a problem when a similarly situated future litigant satisfies
the previous constitutional level5 but implicates no separation of
powers problems. For example, the judiciary may be the most
suitable choice for fashioning a remedy for the new litigant.5"
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides an example of
such a choice, although not explicitly couched in the language of standing. Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), is a case where "[t]he exhaustion
doctrine is best exemplified." DAvID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 72 (1982). In
Myers, the plaintiff sued to enjoin the NLRB from hearing an unfair labor practice
case, arguing that the challenged practices were beyond the Board'sjurisdiction. See
Myers, 303 U.S. at 46. The Court dismissed, invoking"the long settled rule ofjudicial
administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief.., until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted." Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
Certainly, the Court could have fashioned a remedy which would have redressed
the plaintiff. (The Court could have granted the injunction, prohibiting the NLRB
from hearing the unfair labor practice claim.) It did not hear the plaintiff's case,
though. The traditionaljustification behind the exhaustion doctrine is that the Court
reasons that the executive branch and its administrative remedies would be a more
appropriate recourse for the plaintiff. "'The exhaustion doctrine is... an expression
of executive and administrative autonomy.'" McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
194 (1969) (quoting LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
425 (1965)). Consequently, separation of powers concerns kept the plaintiff out of
court.
' The Court could just as easily decide to deny standing due to one of the other
constitutional prongs.
s Such a litigant may possess a redressability of fifty-five.
An example of such a litigant would be the plaintiff in Myers, if she had already
exhausted all potential administrative remedies. This plaintiff possesses the required
degree of redressability to satisfy the previous constitutional level and, due to the
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Nonetheless, the inclusion of the ill-fitted separation of powers
analysis into the constitutional question distorts the redressability
requirements. The second litigant would be denied judicial access,
as he only possesses a redressability of fifty-five, whereas the new,
distorted constitutional level would now be sixty. Future courts are
denied the opportunity to grant standing to this litigant.7
There is little correlation between separation of powers analysis
and the redressability prong of the Court's constitutional require-
ment. It is therefore inappropriate for the separation of powers
issue to be included in the Article III analysis because such inclusion
detracts from judicial power. Courts, unable to override the newly
revised constitutional obstacle, will be prevented from evaluating
the "countervailing considerations [which] may outweigh the con-
cerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power when
the plaintiff's claim to relief" implicates no separation of powers
concerns.
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Additionally, the improper analysis of separation of powers
unnecessarily detracts from congressional power. It is at least
arguable that a congressional grant of standing will, of its own force,
alleviate most worries about separation of powers due to the fact
that Congress itself is the branch that authorizes the grant of
standing. 9 The typical argument for disallowing judicial access
due to separation of powers concerns is that the particular problem
at issue is one that is more appropriately addressed by the majoritar-
ian Congress than by the counter-majoritarian judiciary. 60 "Gong-
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, implicates no separation of powers
concerns.
" For examples of Supreme Court decisions denying future courts the chance
to examine factors that mitigate separation of powers concerns, see infra notes
413-24, 439-58 and accompanying text.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
5 The majority of the Court in Lujan would argue that even congressional
grants of standing implicate separation of powers concerns when Congress author-
izes suit against the Executive. See infra notes 508-18 and accompanying text.
o See Logan, supra note 23, at 47 (arguing that in a democracy, broad ques-
tions are best handled by elected representatives); see also Scalia, supra note 8, at
894 (advocating the appropriateness of restricting "courts to their traditional
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of
the majority, and exclud[ing] them from the even more undemocratic role of pre-
scribing how the other two branches should function in order to serve the interest
of the majority itself" (emphasis omitted)); Sarah A. Robichaud, Note, Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation: The Supreme Court Tightens the Reins on Standing for
Environmental Groups, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 443, 473 (1991) ("[I]t is clear that the
Supreme Court would prefer organizations seeking to challenge broad agency
actions to request relief from Congress, as opposed to the judiciary.").
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ress' power to find facts, to determine the relationship between
congeries of facts and to resolve questions of policy" makes the
legislative branch very well-equipped to respond to broad issues.
61
In the case of a congressional grant of standing, the majoritarian
Congress has used its abilities and already decided to allow the
courts to hear widespread grievances, thereby "mitigat[ing] the
separation of powers concerns." 2 Yet, the importation of separa-
tion of powers issues into the constitutional doctrine prevents even
the majoritarian Congress from using its abilities to perform its
lawmaking function.6 Even if Congress attempts to act, "the
requirements of Art[icle] III remain. .. ." 6 Avoidance of such
importation is important because "it allows the democratic branch[]
a role in deciding whether a judicial remedy is desirable for a
question of broad social importance."65 Therefore the inclusion of
separation of powers concerns into the constitutional analysis
infringes upon both congressional and judicial power.
Other potential justifications for standing-such as international-
ism, federalism, and military deference-must also be separated
from the constitutional analysis. The Court's three-pronged test is
again particularly rl-suited to promote the furtherance of interna-
tionalism,66 military deference, or federalism. 7
The Court's constitutional analysis, therefore, framed by the
three-pronged test, most effectively guarantees the Court a clear
6' Logan, supra note 23, at 61.
6 2 PA L M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 137 (3d ed. 1988).
' Professor Sunstein's recent article on Lujan further discusses the relationship
between congressional grants of standing, separation of powers, and the Article III
limits upon standing. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries, "and Article II, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). Sunstein argues that the
limitations that the Lujan Court places upon Congress's ability to authorize suits
have no "basis ... in constitutional text or history." Id. at 214.
" Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976)
[hereinafter EKWRO].
'6 Logan, supra note 23, at 82. Indeed, Professor Logan argues not merely that
the presence of Congress mitigates separation of powers worries, but rather that
"separation of powers concerns [affirmatively] counsel the Court to defer to
Congress' ability" to authorize standing. Id. at 61.
' For a more detailed discussion of how the three-pronged test is not correlated
to internationalism, see infra notes 376-77 and accompanying text.
67 See Nichol, supra note 6, at 101 (criticizing Supreme Court decisions that, in
truth, deny standing on federalism concerns but, as the three-pronged test mandates,
"purportedly dismiss[] the claim... because of an absence of injury"); Nichol, supra
note 33, at 650 ("[T]he expansion of standing's umbrella [into the area of federalism]
will ill serve article UH.").
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presentation of the issues. The three requirements are hardly self-
defining.
B. The Constitutional Test
1. The Injury Limitation
The Court, in articulating its injury limitation, requires that the
injury satisfy four requirements. First, the injury must be to a
"legally-protected interest.""8 Second, the interest must be "partic-
ularized" to the plaintiff.69 Third, the injury must be likely to
occur, not merely "speculative."" Finally, the injury must be
"'imminent.'"71
a. Legally Protected Interests
In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must have an injury to
an interest that the courts will recognize. Courts recognize three
classes of interests: constitutional, statutory, and judicially-created
interests.
The Constitution, "of its own force, creates legally protected
interests." 72  The Court recognizes that every person has an
interest in those rights provided directly by the Constitution. For
example, the Court will grant standing for cases where a litigant
claims an interest in the equal protection of the laws,7 3 or in the
avoidance of a taking,74 or in the avoidance of the establishment
68 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. See generally 13 WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 3531.4, at
420-23 (discussing what constitutes a legally protected interest); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1915, 1929-39 (1986)
(considering the concept of judicially cognizable interests).69 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)
(granting standing on a claim of injury due to racial discrimination only to those "who
are personally denied equal treatment"); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)
(requiring an allegation of "particularized injury" to the plaintiff).
70 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
71 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155
(1990)).
Nichol, supra note 6, at 92.
See Northeastern Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302-05
(1993) (reversing the Court of Appeals' denial of standing, and noting prior cases that
granted standing due to an injury to a person's interest in equal protection of the
laws); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-08 (1962) (granting standing on a similar
analysis).
7' See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 69, 72-81
(1978) (granting standing due in part to a person's interest in avoiding a taking
without just compensation).
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of religion.75  The Constitution itself creates legally protectible
interests that the Court must recognize as worthy of standing.
In addition, Congress, through statutes, can create interests
beyond those that the Constitution protects. "Congress may enact
statutes creating legal" interests which would not exist solely from
the Constitution itself.76 Often, courts infer a congressionally
mandated interest. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co,
77
two tenants of an apartment building sued the owner of the
building for discrimination against nonwhites in the rental of
apartments, alleging an injury to their interest in living in a
desegregated community."8 The Court reasoned that although the
Civil Rights Act of 19687' did not explicitly protect the interest of
"benefits from interracial associations,"80 the Court must give the
relevant provision of the statute a "generous construction" so as to
"give vitality to the intent of eliminating racial discrimination in
housing."8" Therefore, the Court "interpreted the... provision[s]
of the Civil Rights Act" as implicitly protecting such an interest.
8 2
Lastly, the courts themselves can create interests when neither
Congress nor the Constitution has identified a protected interest.
8 3
Environmental interests are a relatively recentjudicial phenomenon.
Aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests in the environ-
ment "would have been unthinkable in the 1940's." s4 Yet today,
the courts routinely acknowledge such interests.8 5  Numerous
examples of other such court-created interests exist.8 6 As society's
"' See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-06 (1968) (granting standing due to a
person's interest in avoiding the establishment of religion).
" Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). Justice Brennan has
suggested that "[tihe Framers of the Constitution, of course could, and did, exercise
the same power" to create legal interests when framing the Constitution. Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 492 n.2 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
409 U.S. 205 (1972).
78 See id., 409 U.S. at 207-08.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3600-3631 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
'o Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210.
81 Id. at 212.
82 Bullock, supra note 27, at 615.
s See Nichol, supra note 6, at 89 (explaining that "the judiciary can interpret
article III to develop a body of law that seeks to define" protected interests).
' Scalia, supra note 8, at 886.
s See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2137 (noting that observation of an animal, even for
"aesthetic purposes," is ajudicially protected interest); see also Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (offering similar analysis).
' See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973) (creating interest in obtaining a
legal abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1972) (creating interest
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need for protection of these areas grew, the Court became more
willing to redefine its realm of legally protected interests. 7 It
makes sense that a court would be more willing to hear a litigant's
case if the case is based on an interest which society has grown to
cherish. For example, the reason environmental interests were not
considered equally protected interests fifty years ago is because
society, at that time, did not value the environment as much as it
does now. Earlier courts would assume that a litigant bringing forth
suit on behalf of an injury to such an interest could not possibly
bring forth a zealous case."8 As values changed, however, "our
society, and in turn, the judiciary, eventually recognized concern for
the environment as a protectible interest." 9 In this manner, the
courts often recognize interests which have not been recognized by
Congress or the Constitution.
90
b. Particularized Interests
Even if a plaintiff alleges harm to a legally protected interest,
there is no guarantee that she will have standing. "[T]he 'injury in
fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It
requires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured."91 The courts have required that the injury be particular-
ized. The particularity requirement has two components: the injury
must "affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."
92
in unmarried couple's use of contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481 (1965) (creating interest in married couple's use of contraception).
87 One commentator has criticized this method of determining legally protect-
ed interests: "The problem with this requirement is that by the time society and
then the courts decide that an issue is important and widespread enough to
become a public value, many have already suffered injury." Bridget Klauber, See
No Evi Hear No Evil: The Federal Courts and the Silver Spring Monkeys, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 501, 509 (1992).
' See Nichol, supra note 6, at 89 ("One can recall when the courts would have
called a plaintiff claiming harm [to environmental interests] ... an interloper
asserting no injury whatsoever.").
" Id. at 90; see also id. at 92 ("I have argued that the judicial recognition of
[interests] is a process whereby public values are given cognizance in law.").
"°Just as the courts can create interests as societal demands dictate, the courts
will also eliminate interests consistent with societal demands. "During substantial
periods of our history, for example, whites might well have considered themselves
injured by a governmental decision that forced them to ride in the same railroad
car with blacks." Id. at 90. Today, because society no longer demands racial
separation, the courts will not protect such an interest.
91 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
92 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 n.1.
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The courts, in using the term individual, mean that the injury
must occur specifically to the plaintiff. A litigant does not have
standing to sue for an injury to someone else when that litigant
herself has not suffered an injury. Plaintiffs must "show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered
[entirely] by other" people who are not before the Court.
9
3
" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975). It is important to note that there is
a difference between the constitutional requirement that the plaintiff herself be
among the injured and the nonconstitutional bar to what the courts call "third party
standing." If a plaintiff does not suffer an injury herself, she does not satisfy the
Article III requirements and must therefore be denied standing due to constitutional
limitations. Conversely, a plaintiff may be denied standing because she is a third
party plaintiff although she does pass the constitutional injury threshold. Although
she will bring a zealous enough case to satisfy the Article III limits, the third party
plaintiff typically will be denied judicial access because the courts usually decide on
a prudential basis that this plaintiff is not the "best suited to assert a particular claim."
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). (Courts have
discretion, naturally, to override the prudential barrier in certain circumstances,
provided the litigant satisfies the constitutional requirement of a "'sufficiently
concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute." Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct.
1364, 1370 (1991)). A denial of standing to a third party plaintiff is a prudential
limitation, not a constitutional one. The Court has been explicit about this
distinction. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 ("[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury
sufficient to meet the 'case or controversy' requirement, this Court has held that the
plaintiff.., cannot rest his claim to relief on the.., interests of third parties."); see
also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978)
(making note of the "prudential limitation on standing when rights of third parties
are implicated"). Thus, when a court limits a plaintiff's third party standing, it does
so prudentially-there is no doubt that the plaintiff has suffered an individual injury
which passes constitutional muster. For articles attempting to give a general analytical
framework for third party standing cases, see generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third
Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984); Robert A. Sedler, Standing to Assert
Constitutionaljus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE LJ. 599 (1962); Note, Standing
to Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
Similarly, overbreadth challenges, like third party standing cases, exist where the
litigant mounts "a constitutional attack premised on the rights of parties not before
the court." Monaghan, supra, at 282. In the interest of furthering the protection of
First Amendment freedoms, overbreadth doctrine permits "a litigant whose own
activities are unprotected [to] challenge a statute by showing that it substantially
abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the Court." Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980). It is
important to understand, though, that before a litigant can bring an overbreadth
challenge, she must satisfy the Article III injury requirements. An overbreadth
litigant who receives standing does so not because she is "directly asserting the other
person's rights to engage in protected conduct; rather [because] she is asserting her
[own] right to be free from control by an invalid statute." Fletcher, supra note 6, at
244. The overbreadth litigant "has always had the ight to... make a facial challenge
to the constitutional sufficiency of the rule actually applied to him, irrespective of the
privileged character of his own activity." Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 3. Therefore, like third party standing cases, overbreadth cases satisfy the
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By personal, the courts mean that the plaintiff must have a
"personal stake" in the outcome of the case. 4 Whereas the
individualized injury requirement focuses on whether the individual
plaintiff has suffered an injury, the personal stake requirement
focuses on how much injury this plaintiff must suffer in order to get
standing. The Court does not typically require a large degree of
personal stake to confer standing. "[A]n identifiable trifle is enough
for standing."95  It is important to recognize, though, that the
identifiable trifle requirement is relative to the rest of the popula-
tion. The Court makes it clear that it will not grant standing to an
individual, even if she suffers more injury than an identifiable trifle,
if the injury that she suffers is "common to all members of the
public."9" The personal stake requirement must be evaluated not
in terms of whether the plaintiff suffers any injury at all, but rather
in terms of whether the plaintiff suffers an injury which distinguish-
es her from the public at large. A person does not suffer enough
of a personal injury to pass constitutional muster if she is merely a
non-"Hohfeldian plaintiff,"9" that is, a plaintiff with no "interest
other than seeing the law enforced according to its own terms."
98
Clearly, incorrect resolution of the law is at least a trifle of an
injury.9 The problem is that this injury is one that every person
in the population shares. The Court will deny standing to such an
injury.
In Baker v. Carr,' Tennessee voters challenged the validity of
a state legislative apportionment scheme that had not been reappor-
tioned since 1901 despite substantial population changes. 10 1 The
plaintiffs, who lived in the disfavored districts, asserted that they
were denied equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Article III injury requirements. Courts can then grant or deny standing based upon
prudential discretion.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth C. Davis, Standing. Taxpayers and
Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)).
96 Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).917Jaffe, supra note 45, at 1034-35.
98 Chayes, supra note 6, at 11; see also Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 ("We have
consistently held that a plaintiff... claiming only harm to his and every citizen's
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws ... does not state an
Article III case or controversy.").
' See Davis, supra note 95, at 613 (noting that the identifiable trifle may be the
assertion of a "principle against the.., government").
100 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
101 See id. at 186-92.
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Fourteenth Amendment by the malapportionment of the state
legislature." 2 The Court held that the plaintiffs had suffered a
personal injury distinct from the rest of the population's general
interest in assuring that the state government does not violate the
Constitution.' Since the plaintiffs actually resided in the districts
that suffered from the challenged apportionment, they had a
"personal, if minuscule... stake in the outcome." 10 4 By contrast,
if plaintiffs outside the disfavored districts had challenged the plan
of apportionment, they would almost definitely have been denied
standing because their only interest would have been in the correct
resolution of the law-not enough to distinguish them from the
population as a whole. The injury that the real plaintiffs suffered
was their placement in a "position of constitutionally unjustifiable
inequality vis-&vis" the rest of the population.0 5 Voters who were
placed in this position suffered an injury distinct from other
members of the public and therefore had standing.
A second area in which the Court disallows suits common to the
entire population is in taxpayer suits. The theory behind such a suit
is that the plaintiff suffers an injury larger than an identifiable trifle
when the government deprives the plaintiff of the use of her tax
dollars for purposes that violate the law. In Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,' the
plaintiffs alleged that a conveyance of seventy-seven acres of surplus
government-owned land to a Christian college violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.' The plaintiffs based
standing on the fact that their tax dollars had been used for an
unconstitutional purpose. 0 8 The Court denied standing, explain-
ing that because everyone pays taxes, a taxpayer plaintiff without
more injury than a deprivation of tax money is really no different
102 See id. at 193-94.
I's See id. at 204-08.
0' Chayes, supra note 6, at 11.
105 Baker, 369 U.S. at 207; see also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993)
(noting that North Carolina residents stated a claim upon which relief can be granted
when they challenged the state's allegedly unconstitutional redistricting legislation).
1- 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
107 See id. at 468-69.
'o
5 See id. at 469 ("The complaint asserted that each member 'would be deprived
of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes in
violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment... .'"); see also id. at 497-98
(Brennan,J., dissenting) ("The concept of taxpayer injury necessarily recognizes the
continuing stake of the taxpayer in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has
contributed his taxes ....').
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than the rest of the population. 0 9 The Court equated the taxpay-
er plaintiff to the non-Hohfeldian plaintiff. "[C]itizens generally
[can]not establish standing simply by claiming an interest in
governmental observance of the Constitution... ."10 The
assertion of an injury that everyone else suffers does not satisfy the
constitutional requirement of personal stake.
While the personal injury requirement does mandate that the
plaintiff suffer at least a trifle of an injury above the general
population,1 1' there is no automatic lack of standing if many
people suffer the same injury that the plaintiff suffers. "[S]tanding
is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same
injury."" 2  Thus the Court seems to imply that if many people
suffer the same injury, 11 there is no constitutional bar, but if
everyone suffers the same injury, there is a constitutional bar.
114
109 See id. at 476-82.
o Id. at 482. To complicate matters, there is an exception to this rule.
Taxpayers, in a limited context, do have standing "solely on their status as taxpayers,"
even if they do not allege an injury that separates them from the rest of the
population. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968). The plaintiffs in Flast
received standing because their taxpayer challenge was "made to an exercise by
Congress of its power under Art. I, § 8, to spend for the general welfare." Id. at 103.
Since the grant of property in Valley Forge challenged an act of Congress's power
under the Property Clause, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and not under Article I,
Section 8, the plaintiff was denied standing. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80; see
also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974)
(denying standing because plaintiffs "did not challenge an enactment under Art. I,
§ 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch"); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (denying standing because plaintiff's challenge was "not
addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA").
Professor Chayes has characterized this distinction as follows: "As the law now
stands, a taxpayer apparently has standing to stop the government from giving away
money for religious purposes, but not to stop it from giving away property." Chayes,
supra note 6, at 13.
'11 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining that a plaintiff must
suffer an injury distinct from one that every person in the population shares in order
to satisfy the injury requirement).
" United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see also Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 (noting that standing is
appropriate "where concrete injury has been suffered by many persons").
1s When many people suffer the same injury, the Court calls the injury a
"generalized grievance." Logan, supra note 23, at 47; see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at
475.
11' It is important to emphasize that there is a critical distinction between an injury
suffered by the whole population and an injury that the Court calls a "generalized
grievance." An injury suffered by all citizens, such as a denial of the "interest of all
citizens in constitutional governance," does not pass constitutional muster. Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 483 (quoting Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217). Such an injury "cannot
alone satisfy the requirements of Art. M without draining those requirements of
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c. Nonspeculative Injury
Even if a plaintiff alleges a sufficiently particularized injury to a
legally protected interest, the injury must be likely to occur, not
merely speculative. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons," 5 four Los
Angeles police officers stopped the plaintiff for a traffic code
violation. After Lyons got out of his car, the police officers seized
him and applied a chokehold that rendered him unconscious,
"although Lyons offered no resistance or threat whatsoever.""
6
Lyons sued the officers for damages and sued for an injunction
against the city, seeking to bar the use of chokeholds in the future,
absent situations where the proposed victim "reasonably appears to
be threatening the immediate use of deadly force."" 7 The Su-
preme Court discussed only the second claim and held that Lyons
had no standing to bring such a suit."' It reasoned that while the
police clearly injured Lyons in the past, there was little likelihood
that they would injure him again in the future. He did not have
standing to enjoin the use of chokeholds in the future, the Court
reasoned, because he had not established that he was likely to suffer
injuries from them in the future. The Court explained:
That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police [in the
past], while presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages
against the individual officers.. . , does nothing to establish a real
and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic
violation, or for any other offense, by ... officers who would
illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation
or resistance on his part."9
meaning." Id. Conversely, when an individual alleges a generalized grievance-an
injury shared by many but not suffered by the population as a whole-such an injury
satisfies the Constitution's personal stake requirement. Courts will usually deny
standing for such injuries, but they will explicitly do so for prudential reasons. See
id. at 47475 ("[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to
meet the requirements of Art. III, the Court has refrained from adjudicating...
'generalized grievances'... .); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 99-100 (1979) ("Even when a case falls within these constitutional boundaries, a
plaintiff maystill lack standingunder the prudential principles bywhich thejudiciary
seeks to avoid deciding [a generalized grievance]."); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,80 (1978) (denying standing due to "prudential
concerns" about hearing "generalized grievance[s]").
Is 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
1
6 Id. at 97.
117 Id. at 98 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
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Even if a plaintiffs injury to a protected interest is both
particularized and nonspeculative, the actual occurrence of the
injury must be imminent. 21  In Coral Construction Co. v. King
County,122 the defendant county preferentially granted contracts
and subcontracts to businesses owned by either minorities or wom-
en. 2  The plaintiff, a non-minority general contractor, alleged
that King County's practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 The plaintiff sought an injunction
of the defendant's preferential treatment, claiming an injury to its
economic interests through loss of future bids.
25
The court first reasoned that the plaintiffs future injury was not
speculative. "It is highly probable that Coral Construction will again
bid on work let by King County" and thereby suffer injury when
their bid is preferentially denied.16 The court continued, stating
that "[t]his alone, however, is insufficient to confer standing upon
Coral Construction."127 The plaintiffs must not only allege highly
120 Id. at 108; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976) (holding that
standing must be denied due to speculative nature of injury); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (denying standing because plaintiff's allegations of future
illegal conduct took the Court "into the area of speculation and conjecture"). In
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court, while granting standing to a single
female and ultimately deciding that she did have a protected interest in the right
to abortion, denied standing to a married couple who likewise alleged an injury to
their right to abortion. See id. at 128. The Does, a childless couple, claimed a
personal stake in the right to an abortion. See id. at 127. Mrs. Doe's physician had
advised her to avoid pregnancy for health reasons. See id. The Does claimed that
Mrs. Doe might become pregnant due to possible failure of her contraception. See
id. at 128. If this occurred, she might need an abortion to avoid the health
impairment that would arise from a pregnancy. The Court denied standing due to
the speculative nature of the injury. See id. "Their alleged injury rests on possible
future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, ... and possible future
impairment of health. Any one or more of these several possibilities may not take
place and all may not combine." Id. at 128.
' See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (noting that injury must be imminent);
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (same); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (same).
'2 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 875 (1992).
12 See id. at 914.
124 See id. at 914-15.
125 See id. at 929.
26 Id. at 929-30 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 930.
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probable injury, but they "must also demonstrate imminent...
injury." 2 s The court ultimately granted standing, noting that the
plaintiff suffers injury "every time the company simply places a
bid."129 The point of this case, however, is that the court explicitly
enunciates the independent requirement of imminence. Presum-
ably, by acknowledging that the plaintiff suffers injury whenever it
bids, the court is assuming that the plaintiff will bid imminently,
and therefore suffer an imminent injury.
2. Causation
After satisfying the injury prong, the plaintiff must then satisfy
the causation prong of the constitutional standing test. In most
cases, the causation inquiry will be identical to the redressability
inquiry, which is the third prong.' Certain sources, however,
explicitly distinguish the two requirements.' To the extent that
a difference does exist, "it is that the [causation inquiry] examines
the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and
the alleged injury, whereas the [redressability inquiry] examines the
causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief
requested."1 32  The causation question asks whether the chal-
lenged conduct causes the injury. The redressability question asks
whether the requested relief to the challenged conduct will redress
the injury. In most cases, the requested relief amounts to the
cessation of the challenged conduct'"8 and therefore renders




I" See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The
'traceability' and 'redressability' requirements are closely related."); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Babbitt, 835 F. Supp. 654,663 (D.D.C. 1993) (stating that "the causation and
redressability prongs of standing are often replicated"); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS, § 13, at 68 n.4 3 (4th ed. 1983) (calling the
two inquiries "two facets of a single causation requirement"); Klauber, supra note 87,
at 506 (explaining that some courts have "combined the causation and redressabiity
into one requirement").
. See Nichol, supra note 6, at 71 n.16 ("I have argued... that.., the causation
and redressabiity requirements are distinct." (citation omitted)).
2 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984).
I" For example, inLujan, the challenged conductwas the lack of consultation and
the requested remedy was the undertaking of consultation. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at
2140-42.
1" See New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1481 (D.D.C. 1985) ("[Causation]
and redressability'are inseparable in the present case because the relief plaintiffs seek
is an [injunction] compelling the [defendant] to end the very inaction which is the
10851994]
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the requested relief seeks more than the cessation of the challenged
conduct. In such cases, it is possible that the requested relief will
redress an injury that was not caused by the defendant's conduct.
The case of Allen v. Wright..5 provides such an example.
In Allen, the plaintiffs alleged that the Internal Revenue Service
had "not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its
obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools."" 6 The plaintiffs, parents of black public school
children, argued that the IRS, by exempting certain racially
discriminatory private schools from having to pay taxes, interfered
with the ability of the plaintiffs' children to attend racially integrat-
ed public schools. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the IRS's grant
caused an underrepresentation of whites, and, consequently, a lack
of desegregation, in the public schools that their children attend-
ed.' The Court denied standing, holding that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the constitutional requirement of causation.
3 9
The Court reasoned that the line of causation between the IRS's
allegedly illegal grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
private schools and the lack of desegregation of plaintiffs' schools
is "attenuated at best." 4 ' The plaintiffs did not show that with-
drawal of the tax-exempt status from the discriminatory private
schools would cause a "parent of a child attending such a private
school [to] decide to transfer the child to public school as a result
of any changes . .. made by the private school once it was threat-
ened with loss of tax-exempt status." 4' Consequently, the plain-
tiffs did not show that the IRS's grant caused the injury of effective-
ly segregated public schools.
cause of plaintiffs' injuries.'" (citation omitted)).
135 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
1
56 Id. at 737.
1 See id. at 744-45.
1'" The causation argument that the plaintiffs tried to make "was simple."
Nichol, supra note 33, at 640 n.26. Dean Nichol described the causation as
follows:
[T]ax-exempt status makes private schools economically more attractive.
The IRS procedures allow private schools to retain that status while
practicing racial discrimination. The IRS procedures thereby foster and
encourage private discriminatory schools. The formation and expansion
of these schools in plaintiffs' school districts harms the process of deseg-
regation.
Id.
139 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 753.
140 Id. at 757.
141 Id. at 758.
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Similarly, if the relief requested were limited to the cessation of
the illegal conduct, one could use the above analysis to conclude
that the plaintiffs could not prove that the remedy would redress
the injury of effectively segregated public schools. 142  If the
plaintiffs had requested a remedy, however, that went "well beyond
the violation of law alleged," it might then have been possible to
find that the remedy would redress the injury. 143 For example, if
the plaintiffs had requested an injunction requiring the IRS not only
to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools,
but also to penalize private schools that did not cease their
discriminatory behavior, it is far more likely that the requested
remedy would redress the injury. Nonetheless, "[e]ven if the ...
[plaintiffs'] request might have a substantial effect on the desegrega-
tion of public schools," thereby satisfying the redressability
requirement, the plaintiffs would still be unable to prove that the
IRS's illegal activity caused the injury of effectively segregated
public schools. 144 Therefore, the plaintiffs were denied standing
because they could not satisfy the second constitutional require-
ment.
In most cases, however, the causation and redressability
questions merge. Indeed the Supreme Court has often explicitly
equated the two requirements: "The more difficult step in the
standing inquiry is establishing that these injuries 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action of the defendant,' ... or put
otherwise,... that the exercise of the Court's remedial powers would
redress the claimed injuries.
" 145
3. Redressability
The Court has failed to give a precise definition of redres-
sability'46 by varying the degree of specificity necessary to satisfy
Article I. The standard has changed from requiring the plaintiff
1 Even if the Court granted such a remedy by enjoining the IRS from exempting
discriminatory schools, the plaintiffs still would not be able to show that the white
parents of the private school children would move their children from the private
schools to the public schools.
" Id. at 753 n.19.
1 Id.
'" Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978)
(emphasis added) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41
(1976)).
See Nichol, supra note 33, at 650 ("The redressability standard has been so
aggressively manipulated that one would be hard-pressed to define it.").
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to show that the "prospective relief will remove the harm,"14 7 to
requiring the plaintiff to show a "substantial likelihood"' that the
relief will redress the injury, to requiring the plaintiff to only show
that the injury is "likely to be redressed."'4 9
It is possible that the difficulty in defining redressability arises
from the fact that the likelihood of redressability often varies with
the likelihood that the injury would occur again even if the
requested relief were not granted. For example, in O'Shea v.
Littleton,5 ' nineteen individuals tried to enjoin the defendants, a
magistrate and a circuit court judge, from applying the law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 ' The defendants had
engaged in "illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury-fee practic-
es"152 in a racially discriminatory manner in the past. The plain-
tiffs, alleging an injury to their right to be free from future judicial
discrimination on account of race, sought an injunction against such
future conduct. It is clear that the request, if granted, would have
redressed the injury. 5 ' Yet the Court denied standing, doubting
whether the injunction could provide "adequate ... relief."'54
The primary basis for this denial of standing was the fact that even
without judicial intervention, there was only a small likelihood that
the plaintiffs "will again be arrested for and charged with violations
of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings,
trial, or sentencing. ""' The Court denied standing not due to a
lack of redressability but rather because it felt the remedy was not
needed. 156
14
7 EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 505 (1975)).
l Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 75 n.20.
149 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977)
(quoting EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 38).
1- 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
151 See id. at 490.
152 Id. at 495.
155 An injunction would presumably have prevented future racial discrimination
by the defendants.
154 O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 499.
155 Id. at 496.
" A numerical example helps to clarify how this works. Assume, for the sake of
argument, that the requested relief in O'Shea would lead to a 100% chance that the
injury would be redressed. The plaintiffs are assured that the defendants will no
longer racially discriminate. The Court denied standing because, even without the
remedy, there was already a 90% chance that the injury would not occur. The fact
that the remedy only improves the chances of redressability by 10% suggests that the
judicial remedy was not really needed in the first place.
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Conversely, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,'5 7
Alan Bakke applied to medical school and was rejected. The
university openly employed a special admissions program that
reserved sixteen of one hundred seats for minority students. Bakke
challenged the program under the Fourteenth Amendment and
alleged an injury to his medical career. Despite the fact that Bakke
could not guarantee that he would have been admitted "even absent
any preference for minorities,"15 the Court awarded standing.
Instead of denying standing because the elimination of the program
would not have assured Bakke's successful admission into medical
school, the Court granted standing because the elimination of the
program gave him the chance to "compete for all 100 places."' 59
The Court allowed Bakke's suit not because of guaranteed redres-
sability, but because the remedy increased his chances of alleviating
the injury.'
60
Ultimately, redressability is not an absolute standard. This may
give rise to the judicial inconsistency in definition. Nonetheless, the
157 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
"8 BATOR, supra note 62, at 130; see also Nichol, supra note 6, at 81 (question-
ing "Alan Bakke's ability to prove that he would have been admitted to medical
school absent the contested... program").
1
59 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n.14. The Supreme Court in Northeastern Fla.
Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993), has recently reaffirmed the
type of standing granted in Bakke, even though there is no guaranteed redress-
ability:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the
barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for
the barrier in order to establish standing.
Id. at 2303.
0 Whereas the possibility that the requested relief in O'Shea was hypothetically
100%, see supra note 156 and accompanying text, the possibility that eliminating
the contested program in Bakke would result in Bakke's admission into medical
school is rather speculative. Assume, for argument's sake, that his chances of
admission, if the Court had enjoined the program, were 70%. The Court granted
Bakke (and his 70% chance of redressability) standing, but denied the plaintiffs in
O'Shea (and their 100% chance of redressability) standing. The reason is that
without judicial relief, the O'Shea plaintiffs already had a 90% chance of avoiding
the injury. Meanwhile, Bakke, without judicial relief had a much smaller chance of
avoiding the injury. (Before bringing suit, he had already applied twice and was
rejected both times. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-77.) Assume that his chance of
admission was 30% withoutjudicial intervention. The Court then appears to have
based its redressability determination upon the fact that it helped Bakke's chances
of avoiding the injury by 40%, and thus granted standing even though the Court
could not guarantee redressability. The requested relief would only have helped
the O'Shea plaintiffs by 10%, thus the Court denied standing even though it could
guarantee redressability.
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requirement becomes more sensible when one thinks of it not in
terms of whether the requested remedy will definitely cure the
injury (as in O'Shea, where the Court denied standing), but rather
in terms of whether the requested remedy will greatly improve the
chances of redressing the injury (as in Bakke, where the Court
granted standing).
I. THE IMPORTATION OF PRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS
This Comment has argued that the purpose of constitutional
limitations is to guarantee that the litigants are sufficiently adverse,
which in turn assures the proper sharpening of the issues before the
Court.61 Since the Court first enunciated the requirement of a
personal stake to assure the "concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends"
in 1962,162 the Court has quoted this constitutional standard with
approval in approximately twenty-five majority opinions.1 63 It is
quite dangerous, however, to use the frequency of quotation "as a
basis for predicting what the Court will do about" its constitutional
analysis."M Indeed the Court consistently manipulates its three-
pronged test of constitutionality-which should be used only to
assure zealous advocacy-in order to import considerations which
should be completely independent of the constitutional require-
ments. This inclusion of other factors into the constitutional
analysis results in an inconsistent constitutional doctrine.
A. Historical Manipulation
1. Injury
Commentators do not hesitate to point out the "arbitrariness of
the injury-in-fact test."165 The problems with this test are evident
in many of the individual requirements.
161 See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
162 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
163 Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, US file (Oct. 29, 1993).
16 DAvIS, supra note 6, § 24:18, at 281.
a Chayes, supra note 6, at 19; see also Bullock, supra note 27, at 612 (noting that
the Court's application of injury has "led to confusing and inconsistent results");
Nichol, supra note 6, at 78-79 ("[The] injury standard has failed to provide a[n] ...
objectively ascertainable method of measuring access to the federal courts.").
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a. Inconsistent Interests
A number of early Supreme Court standing decisions illustrate
the "malleability of interest."66 In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 
67
the plaintiff, an Alabama electric power company, sued the Federal
Emergency Administrator of Public Works. 6 The Administrator
had been making loans and grants to Alabama municipalities that
used the money to construct power plants that competed with the
plaintiff's plant.6 The plaintiff alleged that this activity infringed
upon its legally protected interest to be free from competition
supported by government activity. 7  The Court, however, held
that the plaintiff "has no such interest" and could not enjoin the
"lawful, albeit destructive, competition with" the Alabama munici-
palities.' 7 ' "What [the plaintiff] anticipates.., is damage to some-
thing it does not possess-namely, a right to be immune from lawful
... competition." 7 2  In Federal Communications Commission v.
Sanders Brothers Radio Station,'"3 however, the Court granted
standing to a plaintiff with an identical interest. When the FCC
awarded a broadcast license to a private competitor, the plaintiff, a
radio station already possessing a license, sued to enjoin the activity.
The plaintiff alleged an injury to its interest in freedom from
government-supported competition. 74  The Court held that this
was enough of a legally "sufficient interest" to allow the suit to pro-
ceed.' 7
The radio station and the power company both alleged an
interest in freedom from competition that was supported by
government activity. Yet the Court protected the radio station's
interest while rejecting the power company's interest. It is difficult
to distinguish these cases because the interests in question were
singular. Either common law, congressional mandate, or the
Constitution protects an interest or it does not. The Court is
importing factors into its analysis beyond the appropriate question
1 13 WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 3531.4, at 423.
167 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
168 See id. at 476.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 475.
. Id. at 478.17
2 Id. at 480.
1 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
174 See id. at 471-73.
175Id. at 477.
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of whether or not freedom from competition is legally protected by
one of these three sources.
76
One possible external factor that the Court included into its
constitutional analysis is what should be the prudential concern of
federalism. In Sanders Brothers, the party that could have been
potentially injured from a suit which enjoined competition was the
Telegraph Herald, a private newspaper company that wanted to
start a radio station. 7 7 In Alabama Power, however, the potentially
injured parties were the Alabama municipalities that wished to
operate power plants. 17 1 Indeed, the Court stressed that the
biggest problem with the plaintiff's case in Alabama Power was not
that the plaintiff was attempting to enjoin mere competition, but
rather "municipal competition."'7 It is quite possible that the
Court in Alabama Power denied the plaintiff standing because it did
not wish to infringe upon the state of Alabama's rights. 8 0 It is
completely appropriate for the Court to consider federalism
concerns in its standing analysis.' 8 ' It should not, however,
consider federalism in its constitutional analysis. 82 Such a con-
cern must be properly considered as a prudential limitation. 8 By
importing federalism concerns into the constitutional consideration
of whether an interest is legally protected, the Court distorts the
relevant question of whether freedom from competition is a legally
protected interest.
A comparison of Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.' 4
with Warth v. Seldin..5 provides another example in which the
Court examined factors other than the appropriate constitutional
"'6 There is no other way that the Court could conclude in similar cases that
competition is not legally recognized as a sufficient interest in 1938 but then suddenly
is legally recognized in 1940.
177See Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 471.
178 See Alabama Power, 302 U.S. at 473.
179 Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
0 The Court is concerned with preserving the power of the state's municipalities.
See id. (explaining that if the power company should lose business "by the operations
of... municipalities, it will be by lawful competition" (emphasis added)).
181 See infra text accompanying note 392 (discussing why federalism may be
appropriately considered as part of the prudential analysis).
182 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
's If federalism is instead included in the constitutional analysis, which is beyond
the reach of the courts and Congress, then future courts and Congress will be
deprived of their protected discretion to decide whether or not the prudential
concern of federalism is implicated.
184 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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question of whether or not an interest is legally protected. In
Traffikante, the Court granted standing to two tenants who wished
to sue their landlord.18 6 The tenants alleged that their landlord's
discriminatory conduct cost them the "benefits of living in an
integrated community." 117 Conversely, a plaintiff in Warth alleged
deprivation of an identical interest and did not receive standing.
The plaintiff, Metro-Act, claimed that the defendant municipality,
Penfield, had a zoning ordinance that excluded persons of low
income from residing in the town in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation whose
purpose was to try "to alleviate the general housing shortage for low
and moderate income persons" in the area.'89 Metro-Act had
members who already lived within Penfield and members who were
forced to live outside of Penfield due to the restrictive ordi-
nance." ' The Court denied standing to those members who lived
outside Penfield due to lack of causation. 9' Yet it also denied
standing to those members who already lived in Penfield.'92
These members, exactly like the plaintiffs in Trafficante, alleged an
injury to their interest in "the benefits of living in a racially and
ethnically integrated community."' 3 The Court, however, recog-
nized the interest in Trafficante but failed to recognize the interest
in Warth.
The most plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that the
Court imported what should be a prudential concern-separation of
powers-into its constitutional analysis.'94 The Trafficante plaintiffs
received standing because they based their claim upon the Fair
Housing Act, which statutorily granted standing.'95 Such "[a]
116 See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
187 Id. at 208; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing the cog-
nizable interest of the Trafficante plaintiffs in living in a desegregated community).
188 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 493.
189 Id. at 494.
190 See id. at 512.
191 See id. at 506-07. These members could not prove that even if the zoning
ordinances were removed, third party contractors would be willing to build low
income housing. See id. at 506 (explaining that the members' "inability to reside in
Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather
than of respondents' [the town of Penfield and its Zoning, Planning, and Town
Boards'] assertedly illegal acts").
'
92 See id. at 514.
19 Id. at 512.
19 For a discussion of why the use of separation of powers concerns is inappro-
priate for Article III analysis, see supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
'9" See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-12.
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statutory grant of standing does indeed alleviate concerns over
separation of powers."' Conversely, the Warth plaintiffs were
denied standing because their claim was based upon constitutional
grounds, not statutory grounds. Indeed, the Court in Warth
explicitly distinguished Trafficante, in which standing was granted
because of the Civil Rights Act. As the Warth Court stated: "In this
[the existence of a statutory basis for standing], we think, lies the
critical distinction between Trafficante and the situation here."
9 7
Although "there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III
inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right,"9 ' the Court in
Warth appears to have focused its inquiry on the source of the
standing interest. However, just as federalism concerns should
clearly be separated from the constitutional requirement of a legally
protected interest, so should separation of powers concerns be
separated.' 99 As one commentator asked with respect to the
disparity between the Court's holdings in Trafficante and Warth:
"[B]ut is article III analysis well served when injury to the same




The requirement of a "particularized injury" has also proven to
be "an elusive foundation."20 ' In Baker v. Carr,20 2 the plaintiffs
challenged Tennessee's failure to reapportion the seats in the state
legislature after a substantial growth and redistribution of the state
population. 20 ' The plaintiffs, residents of disadvantaged districts,
196 Nichol, supra note 33, at 654; ef. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 254 (citing cases
where the Court would not "have granted standing if Congress had not done so by
statute").
197 Warth, 422 U.S. at 513. The reason that a grant of standing based upon the
Constitution implicates separation of powers concerns more than a congressional
grant is that a constitutional grant requires the counter-majoritarianjudiciary, and
its tendency to "enforc[e] the political prejudices of [its] own class," to decide who
should havejudicial access. Scalia, supra note 8, at 896. Conversely, a statutory grant
of standing allows the majoritarian Congress the opportunity to decide the question
ofjudicial access. See supra notes 59.65 and accompanying text.
"' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2144 (1992).
199 Also like federalism concerns, separation of powers concerns should be
appropriately considered as a prudential worry. See infra notes 393-94 and
accompanying text.
200 Nichol, supra note 33, at 654.
201 Nichol, supra note 6, at 71.
202 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
203 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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alleged an injury to their right "to a vote free of arbitrary impair-
ment."20 4  They based their claim upon the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5  The Court granted
standing, holding that the plaintiffs had alleged an adequate
personal stake to distinguish themselves from the rest of the
population.206  Since it is true that only a "trifle" of an injury is
needed to separate a deserving litigant from the public at large,
2 0 7
the Court held that the injury that one suffers from vote dilution
due to the malapportionment of legislative districts is enough to
confer standing.2 Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue that the
plaintiffs' injury was far removed from that of the population in
general.20 ' As Professor Chayes argues, there is not "much
difference between those who brought [the] suit and the non-
Hohfeldian plaintiff."
210
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,21' the
Court denied plaintiffs standing to sue due to their lack of a
personal stake.21 2  Basing their claim upon the Incompatibility
Clause of the Constitution,213 the plaintiffs asserted that certain
members of Congress were simultaneously serving in the Re-
serve. 214 The plaintiffs asked the Court to require the Secretary
of Defense to strike these members of Congress from the Re-
serve. 215 The Court denied standing, holding that the plaintiffs
did not allege a "personal stake" separate from the injury that "all
citizens share."216  As the dissent explained, however, "[t]he
specific interest which [the plaintiffs] ... asserted ... is certainly
not a 'general interest common to all members of the public.'
217
204 Baker, 369 U.S. at 208.
205 See id. at 207-08.
20 See id. at 208.
217 See Davis, supra note 95, at 613.
21' SeeBaker, 369 U.S. at 237 (stating that malapportionment creates a justiciable"
cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment).
209 All members of the public have an interest in proper vote allocation. Arguably,
the plaintiffs' interest is marginally greater because it is their vote which is diluted.
210 Chayes, supra note 6, at 11. For a description of the non-Hohfeldian plaintiff,
see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
211 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
212 See id. at 220.
2 The Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, provides: "[N]o
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office."
214 See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 210.
215 See id. at 211.216 Id. at 220-21.
21
1 Id. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634
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The plaintiffs were not merely citizens who wanted the law enforced
properly. Rather, they were members of the Reserve itself, and
therefore they had an interest above and beyond that of the
population at large. After all, "Reserve membership ... place[s]
upon Members of Congress possible inconsistent obligations which
might cause them to violate their duty faithfully to perform as
reservists." 211 The plaintiffs, as reservists, surely had an interest
beyond that of the common public in assuring that other Reserve
members did not violate a duty to perform faithfully to the service.
The plaintiffs had a legitimate stake in the avoidance of a conflict
of interests by reservists who were also members of Congress and
therefore subject to conflicting duties.
It is difficult to reconcile the holdings in Baker and
Schlesinger.2 19 In Baker, the plaintiffs were marginally separable
from the public, yet the Court acknowledged their possession of a
personal stake. In Schlesinger, the plaintiffs were clearly separable
from the public, yet the Court did not acknowledge a personal
stake. Schlesinger begins to make more sense, however, when one
considers that the case occurred during the Vietnam War. It is at
least plausible that the military sector of the executive branch
wanted members of Congress to remain in the Reserves so that the
Executive could exert "influence"220 over these reservists. Particu-
larly in times of war, the Supreme Court has been known to distort
the law in order to show deference to the needs of the military.
2 21
By considering military deference in its constitutional standing
analysis, the Court artificially raises the level of the particularized
injury required to satisfy constitutional requirements. Presumably,
a plaintiff who barely satisfied the old constitutional level of
(1937)).
218 Id. at 212.
211 See Nichol, supra note 33, at 655 n.108 ("[W]hy was the action in Schlesinger
characterized as 'abstract,' while a reapportionment plaintiff's injury was deemed
to be 'concrete'?").
22' Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 212 (1974). The source of this executive influence
would be 10 U.S.C. §§ 672-675 (1970), which describes the "President's power to
call reservists to active duty without their consent." Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 212
n.3; see also TRIBE, supra note 42, § 3-18, at 129 (acknowledging that "the presence
of numerous reservists in the halls of Congress" enhances the continuation of
"military-legislative connections").
22 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ("In dealing with matters relating to the prosecution and progress of a
war, we must accord great respect and consideration to the judgments of the
military authorities who are on the scene and who have full knowledge of the
military facts.").
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personal stake outlined in Baker could be denied standing if she did
not meet the stricter Schlesinger level, even where military deference
considerations were not implicated.
c. Inconsistent Speculation
In Rizzo v. Goode,222 the plaintiffs sued the Philadelphia police
department, alleging that the department had violated their
constitutional rights by failing to process adequately a series of
complaints filed against various police officers.223 The district
court granted an injunction affirmed by the Third Circuit, requiring
the police commissioner to formalize directives for handling com-
plaints.224 The Supreme Court reversed, denying standing on the
grounds that "'[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself
show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief... if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.' 225
Because plaintiffs had based their claim not on violations certain
specific officers were likely to commit in the future, but rather on
what an "unnamed minority of policemen might do to [the
plaintiffs] in the future," the harm was found to be too hypothetical,
speculative and conjectural.
2 6
Upon closer examination, it appears that the Court's denial of
standing is influenced by factors beyond just the element of
speculation it finds in the alleged injury. The chances of future
injury brought about by an undisciplined police force were not
unlikely.22 The trial court identified over forty incidents of
alleged police department misconduct, along with alleged inadequa-
cies in the complaint procedures.2 28 This "pattern of abuse,"
229
423 U.S. 362 (1976).22 5See id. at 368.
n4 See id. at 365 n.2.
Id. at 372 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)).22 Id. (citing O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-97 (holding that where allegations do not
name specific violations by individual named parties, plaintiffs lack standing to obtain
injunctive relief, which would require the Court to anticipate the circumstances
attending the future wrong, taking the Court impermissibly "into the area of
speculation and conjecture")).
See Chayes, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that patterns of police abuse could
justify a grant of standing, as in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), which
involved misconduct by the Texas Rangers).
2 See Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability & Responsibility (COPPAR)
v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1294-316 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (detailing numerous instances
of police abuse and misconduct which, coupled with inadequate complaint procedure,
gave rise to the injunction at issue in the Rizzo litigation), affid sub nom. Goode v.
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suggesting that future injury is likely to occur, in and of itself
should have overcome the constitutional limitation on specula-
tion.2 ' 0 The trial court, however, also found an actual "policy of
the department to discourage the filing of citizen complaints, [and]
to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven police miscon-
duct."2 1 With a pattern of abuse and a policy of denying redress,
it is difficult to see why the plaintiffs' future injury is prohibitively
speculative. The district court could in its discretion conclude that
the lack of discipline directly brought about the pattern of abuse.
Once again, the Supreme Court did not limit its constitutional
analysis to the appropriate requirements, but rather deferred to
principles of federalism. Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that
"appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in
determining the availability and scope of equitable relief."212 The
Court imported what should be the prudential concern of federal-
ism into its constitutional analysis,233 improperly increasing the
level of directness required to overcome the Article III prohibition
on speculative injuries.
A similar incorporation of what should be prudential concerns
occurred in Los Angeles v. Lyons. 2 4 As noted earlier, the Court
held that Lyons lacked standing to bring an injunctive cause of
action against future chokeholds because his alleged future injury
was impermissibly speculative. 2 5 It is not so clear, however, that
his injury was that speculative. 16 Indeed, "Lyons is a striking
Rizzo, 506 F. 2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
' Chayes, supra note 6, at 20.2
" See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 383-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that whether
violations are remotely or directly traceable to police department policy is a question
of degree on which the Court should not supplant the conclusion of the district
court's detailed findings that the violations were a pattern likely to recur in the face
of official indifference).
"' COPPAR, 357 F. Supp. at 1318.
2 3 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Nichol, supra
note 6, at 99 ("The Court's negative ruling on injury... reflected its broader belief
that the plaintiffs sought an 'unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the
discretionary authority' committed to local and state officials." (quoting Rizzo, 423
U.S. at 366)).
" See TRIBE supra note 42, § 3-30, at 208 ("The Court's reference to [principles
of federalism] was not appropriate .... ").
23 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
9' 5 Seesupra notes 115-20 and accompanying text (outlining constitutional standing
requirement that threatened future injury be real and immediate, not speculative).
z' The dissent cited several statistics which demonstrated a good possibility that
the police could again apply a chokehold to Lyons. For example, between 1975 and
1983, 12 African-American men died following the use of police chokeholds. See
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example of how the Court distorts the injury requirement in order
to serve the ends" of federalism." 7 As in Rizzo, the Court import-
ed federalism into its constitutional analysis. It stated: "recognition
of the need for a proper balance between state and federal authority
counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers
engaged in the administration of the States' criminal laws."
2 8
Such concerns about federalism should be prudential and distinct
from the constitutional analysis.
2. Historical Manipulation of Redressability
The Court often uses redressability to import prudential
concerns. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc.,239 for example, an environmental organization sued the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a utility company that was
constructing nuclear power plants near members' homes. The
plaintiffs claimed that the Price-Anderson Act,24° which limited
liability in the case of a nuclear accident, constituted an unconstitu-
tional taking by denying full compensation for property in the event
of a nuclear accident.241  They sought a declaratory judgment
pronouncing the Act unconstitutional.
24 2
The Court granted standing because the plaintiffs satisfied the
injury requirement via "the environmental and aesthetic conse-
quences of the thermal pollution of the two lakes in the vicinity of
the disputed power plants."24' Additionally, they satisfied redres-
sability by demonstrating that absent the legislation, there was a
"substantial likelihood" that the nuclear plants would not be
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 115-16 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Lyons was a
24-year-old African-American male. See id. at 114. Also, it had "been the official
policy of the city to permit police officers to employ chokeholds in a variety of
situations where they face no threat of violence." Id. at 116. Indeed the non-
speculative nature of Lyons's injury has become much dearer in light of the Rodney
King episode. See Valerie Richardson, City, Black Leaders Faulted for Actions, WASH.
TIMES, May 1, 1992, at B4 (quoting Jesse Jackson as blaming the LA. riots in the
aftermath of the Rodney King verdict on the "Los Angeles Police Department's
'history of abuse'").
1 7Nichol, supra note 6, at 100.
2"Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112. American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d
1373, 1377 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992), explains that Lyons invoked "principles of ...
federalism in support of its decision[] against federal jurisdiction."
9 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
240 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
241 See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 69.
21 See id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
24
3 Id. at 73.
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completed. 244  This conclusion rested on testimony by nuclear
industry experts that they would not participate in developing
nuclear power plants without the Act's assurance of diminished
liability.245 While such a showing may satisfy the constitutional
level, it is important to bear in mind that there are real doubts as to
whether the invalidation of the Act would actually redress the
injury. For instance, corporate officials admitted at the time of the
trial that they "would have built the plants regardless of the
Act."246  Additionally, trial court evidence revealed that the
Company had already invested most of its $1 billion budget in the
plant by the time of the trial.2 47 It seems likely that the power
companies would not have wanted to lose that money and would
have completed the plant, even with the increased possibility of
liability absent the Act. Nonetheless, the Court granted standing,
holding that plaintiffs satisfied the required redressability level. Is
the Duke Power decision reconcilable with other cases?
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
("EKWRO"), 241 the Court denied standing in part due to insuffi-
cient redressability. The plaintiffs sued the Treasury Department,
challenging a new IRS regulation2 49 which eliminated a require-
ment that a hospital must operate "to the extent of its financial
ability for those not able to pay" in order to receive favorable tax
treatment.250  The plaintiffs, persons unable to afford hospital
services, alleged that the new IRS regulation would encourage
hospitals to deny service to indigents in violation of the tax
code.21' The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had suffered
an injury, as they would now be denied hospital services,252 but it
denied standing on redressability grounds, reasoning that the
plaintiffs could not show that the hospitals would not "forgo
244 Id. at 75; see also Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 215-18 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (noting that nuclear
industry officials and executives testified in support of renewing the Act that they
would not be able to complete their nuclear power plants without extension of the
Act's limited liability), rev'd sub nom Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
245 See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 75.
24 Chayes, supra note 6, at 21 n.105 (citation omitted).
247 See Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 431 F. Supp. at 206.
24 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
249 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
95 EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 31 (quoting Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202).
2' See id. at 33.
252 See id. at 40-41.
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favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain
of an increase in the level of uncompensated services." 25 It was
thus "only speculative" whether the requested remedy would redress
the injury.
25 4
In all likelihood, however, a denial of favorable tax treatment
would have redressed the injury. When the IRS gives a hospital
favorable tax treatment, it classifies the hospital as a charitable
organization in accordance with § 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
255
Such a classification means that potential donors, when donating
money to the hospital, can deduct the donations.256 In effect,
when the IRS gives a hospital favorable tax treatment, it actually
makes the hospital a much more favorable place for donors to give
money than if the IRS did not confer favorable tax treatment.257
The plaintiffs argued that the "hospitals that denied [the plaintiffs]
service receive substantial donations deductible by the donors,"
making it very possible that "these hospitals ... are so financially
dependent upon the favorable tax treatment afforded charitable
organizations that they would admit" the plaintiffs for free treat-
ment.258 Yet the Court denied standing.
2 59
The decisions in EKWRO and Duke Power are difficult to
reconcile. The chances of redressabiity in EKWRO appear greater
than in Duke Power, yet the Court only granted standing in Duke
Power. As one commentator explained:
Personally, I have no trouble with the Court's conclusion that
the plaintiff had standing in Duke Power. My difficulty is in
understanding why a subsidy to the nuclear industry can properly
be said to have caused the construction of nuclear power plants,
'" Id. at 43.
Id. at 44 (citing Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973)).
'ss See id. at 29 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988)).
z See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (allowing for tax deductions for
those who donate to charitable organizations).
" The ability to deduct a donation creates an economic incentive to make such
a donation.
I EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 43; see also DAVIS, supra note 6, § 24:28, at 319
("Voluntary nonprofit hospitals are... dependent upon charitable contributions."
(citation omitted)).
2" Professor Chayes disagreed with the Court's decision on the ground that the
congressional purpose for allowing deductions and other tax incentives is to shape
favorable conduct. Therefore, a disallowance of deductions would redress the
plaintiffs' injury by ultimately shaping the hospital's conduct. "Congress must believe
that these [deductions] have some efficacy in inducing desired conduct on the part
of taxpayers. Why should the Court treat that assumption as 'purely speculative'?"
Chayes, supra note 6, at 19 (quoting EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 42-43).
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but a subsidy to the hospital industry does not have the same
power to induce the provision of free medical services.
260
Allen v. Wright2 6' and Norwood v. Harrison262 are even harder
to reconcile. The plaintiffs in Allen were denied standing because
the Court found no guarantee that the illegal IRS practices caused
the lack of desegregation in the plaintiffs' schools.263 By contrast,
the plaintiffs in Norwood challenged the validity of a Mississippi
statutory program whereby the state purchased textbooks and gave
them to both public and private schools. 26 4 The state gave these
books to both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory private
schools.2 65  The plaintiffs-much like the Allen plaintiffs-alleged
that the government's action, by providing such "direct state aid" to
racially discriminatory private schools, would deter the process of
desegregation.2 66 Unlike in Allen, however, the Court held that
the plaintiffs showed adequate causation between the defendant's
actions and the resultant lack of desegregation.26 The free books
did indeed have "a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and
support private discrimination."
268
An inconsistency appears to exist in the Court's finding that the
tax-exempt status in Allen does not encourage desegregation while
the granting of free books in Norwood does.2 69 "It hardly seems
possible that the 'concrete injury' suffered by plaintiffs in Norwood
differed significantly from the injury suffered by plaintiffs in
[Allen]."2 7 ' The Court again looks at concerns that go beyond the
appropriate constitutional question of redressability. The Allen
decision is quite explicit about which of these concerns it includes
in its analysis. The decision openly states that it is considering
separation of powers concerns as part of its Article III limits.
27 '
26
0 Id. at 22.
261 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
262 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
263 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 ("[T]he alleged injury is not fairly traceable to the
assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS."); see also supra notes 136-41 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the denial of standing in Allen).
2
11 See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 458.
265 See id.
266 See id. at 457.
267 See id. at 455.
268 Id. at 466.
269 On the contrary, one might argue that denial of tax-exempt status has greater
financial consequences than denial of mere textbooks and, thus, a threat to deny tax-
exempt status would be more effective in encouraging desegregation.
270 Roseborough, supra note 41, at 1030.
271 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (stressing that "the standing inquiry must be
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The problem is that the Article III requirements are not wel-suited
to furthering separation of powers principles.
272
The plaintiffs in Allen seem to satisfy traditional notions of
redressability. The Court in Allen nonetheless suggested that the
plaintiffs' injury was not redressable because the causal link between
withdrawal of tax exemptions and the integration of public schools
was speculative. 273  There are three reasons why the Court's
analysis is probably incorrect.2 4 First, the absence of the exemp-
tion would have likely resulted in fewer contributions to private
schools.2 75 Second, "educational institutions are quite vulnerable
to loss of income resulting from the increased cost of dona-
tions." 27 ' Third, many white students would be forced to enroll
in the public schools because fewer would be able "to afford the
cost of discriminatory schools as the loss of contributions... made
attendance more expensive." 277  Hence it seems pretty clear that
the plaintiffs should satisfy the redressability prong.27 ' The Court
still denied standing on the grounds of insufficient redressability,
however, based upon its "introduc[tion] [of] separation of powers
into its [redressability] analysis." 279 As a result, the Court in Allen
"applied ... its standing test far more strenuously than article II
demands and consequently left meritorious plaintiffs without
relief."
210
answered by reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise power
only... when adjudication is 'consistent with a system of separated powers'" (quoting
Chicago & Grand Truck Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)); Haitian
Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (interpretingAllen as "the
Supreme Court's more recent statement that the entire concept of article III rests on
separation of powers"); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3531.2 (Supp. 1993)
(noting the Allen Court's explicit linkage between Article III and separation of
powers).
2 See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
2 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-61 (defining the causal link as "not fairly traceable"
and "attenuated at best").
4 See Roseborough, supra note 41, at 1029 (discussing the reasons).
2s See id. (citing Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions:
Part II-The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAXJ.
209, 224 (1975) (conducting study which concludes that the quantity of a gift to a
school is closely related to the cost of a gift)).
"6 Roseborough, supra note 41, at 1029.
rn Id.
278 SeeAllen, 468 U.S. at 789 (StevensJ., dissenting) ("Considerations of tax policy,
economics, and pure logic all confirm the conclusion that [plaintiffs'] injury in fact
is fairly traceable to the Government's allegedly wrongful conduct."). Professor Tribe
characterizes Stevens's dissent as a "powerful argument." TRIBE, supra note 42, § 3-
18, at 131 n.10.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280 Roseborough, sura note 41, at 1026; see also Nichol. subra note 33. at 658
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Courts are not always clear as to what concern they will import
into the Article III tests. For example, the particular concern that
the Court imported in EKWRO is not as immediately visible as it
was in Rizzo or in Lyons.281 The relevant point, however, is that the
Court consistently analyzes factors as part of the Article III analysis
that are ill-fitted to the three-pronged Article III test.28 2  Such
factors are clearly included to a certain extent in Alabama Power,
Schlesinger, Rizzo, Lyons, EKWRO, and Allen. In Lujan, the Court
imports prudential concerns to an unprecedented extreme.
2 83
("Allen, in short, moves standing doctrine in the wrong direction.").
2' In EKWRO, the Court may have been showing deference to the IRS. The
Court in EKWRO (and perhaps Allen too) may have been apprehensive about
sanctioning private citizens' suits which challenged IRS tax allocations. See MICHAEL
A. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 91 (2d ed. 1988) (questioning the "appropri-
ate[ness] [of] allow[ing] private enforcement of the tax law-whereby citizens, who
believe the IRS is not collecting enough taxes, sue to insure the collection").
Moreover, even in such cases as Lyons and Rizzo where the Court makes it quite
clear that it is worried about the concern of federalism, one commentator has
suggested that the Court is concerned with an additional outside factor: "[o]ne senses
in a variety of cases that the Court carries little empathy for a litigant who bases
future harm on the possibility of repeated encounters with the criminal justice
system." Nichol, supra note 6, at 90. It is at least plausible that the plaintiffs in Lyons
and Rizzo were denied standing not because of the speculative nature of their injuries,
as the Court held, but rather because they based their injuries upon harm which
depended upon a "run-in" with the law. See id.212 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (noting the poor fit between the
Article III test and certain potential justifications for standing). Admittedly, the
ability to accurately identify the particular inappropriate concern which the Court
imports into its three-pronged constitutional analysis provides greater evidence that
the Court actually does erroneously weigh inappropriate factors. The Court is not
always explicit, however, about its particular concerns.
Often, the Courtjust uses the standing doctrine to attain the result it would have
reached on the merits. Dean Nichol argues that in many Supreme Court standing
decisions-such as Alabama Power, EKWRO, Schlesinger, and Allen-the Supreme Court
pretends to perform a proper standing analysis but the decision is really based on
"the Court's view of the claim on the merits." Nichol, supra note 33, at 649; see also
TRIBE, supra note 42, § 3-18, at 131 n.10 (noting that sometimes the Court will ignore
proper standing inquiry "in its.., zeal to reach the merits"); Fletcher, supra note 6,
at 236 ("[A] standing determination is... merely a surrogate for a determination on
the merits .. ").
215 See Nichol, supra note 38, at 1142 (noting that Lujan "will mark a transforma-
tion in the law of standing").
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B. Lujan's Manipulation of the Constitutional Analysis
One Supreme Court doctrine suggests that a Court has ajudicial
duty to avoid rendering decisions about constitutional issues
affecting legislation unless an immediate decision is necessary.
284
The Court derives this doctrine from notions about the need for
limitations on "judicial review of governmental action for constitu-
tionality."215 It seems to follow that if the Court need only discuss
one prong of a multiprong test in order to decide a case, then, out
of judicial restraint, the Court should abstain from deciding the
remaining prongs which are unnecessary to the outcome of the case.
Nonetheless, in Lujan, the Court ignored this doctrine of judicial
restraint.286  In the first part of its opinion, the Court held that
the plaintiff lacked sufficient injury to receive standing.287  This
should have been enough to dispose of the case. Yet the Court still
proceeded to discuss redressability even though it had already
decided that the plaintiff lacked the necessary injury.288  The
Court's failure to exercise judicial restraint resulted in the importa-
tion of what should be prudential factors into two prongs, thereby
distorting the constitutional analysis.
As previously discussed, the plaintiff in Lujan sued in order to
get a judicial determination of the proper geographic scope of
section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 2 9  The
2
1" See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947) ("'[T]he
Court [has] developed.., a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon
a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.'" (quoting
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring))).
U Id. at 571.
286 See Pierce, supra note 48, at 1200 ("The majority opinion in [Lujan] is simply
inconsistent with the principle ofjudicial restraint."). It is ironic thatJustice Scalia,
one of the Court's leading proponents ofjudicial restraint, should write the opinion
which ignores this constitutional doctrine advocating restraint. See Michael A. Perino,
Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENvTL. AFF.
L. REV. 135, 157 (1987) (describing Scalia's "main policy" as "judicial self-restraint");
see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 881 (citing the need to decrease "overjudicialization").
217 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2137-40 (outlining the Court's reasoning in denying the
injury argument).
' 8 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion adheres to the doctrine of restraint. See
id. at 2146 (KennedyJ., concurring) ("In light of the conclusion that [plaintiffs] have
not demonstrated a concrete injury.., sufficient to support standing .... I would
not reach the issue of redressability .... ").
289 See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (describing the plaintiffs'
challenge in the Lujan case); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988) (codifying § 7(a)(2)
of the ESA).
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plaintiff, an environmental group named Defenders of Wildlife,
alleged that several of its members would suffer particularized
injuries beyond that which the public at large would suffer if the
ESA's proper geographic scope were not properly enlarged.
2 90
The Court held that these injuries did not reach a constitutional
level.2 191 The Court reasoned further that the members' injuries
were not redressable by the requested remedy.2 2  Even if the
Court granted the requested relief and forced the Secretary to
consult on foreign projects, there was no guarantee that the
plaintiffs' injuries would be cured. For both of these reasons, the
Court denied standing. While the Court supposedly denied
standing for reasons related to the three-pronged Article III test, it




The Supreme Court has traditionally distinguished between a
generalized grievance, which always satisfies Article III but usually
does not pass the prudential limits, and a grievance common to all
members of the public, which never satisfies the particularity
requirement of Article 111.29 The Court often does not hear cases
of generalized grievances, though they pass constitutional muster,
because those cases raise separation of powers problems. 294 The
2o Apart from the injuries to Amy Skilbred, see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying
text, the plaintiff also alleged particularized injuries to several other members. See
Respondents' Brief at 19-22, 24-26, Lujan (No. 90-1424). For example, Dr. H. Elliott
McClure, a member of Defenders, has worked as an ecologist in Southeast Asia for
25 years and plans to return to Southeast Asia to study the hornbill, a species of bird
which he has studied in the past. Several projects which the U.S. government helps
to support are currently threatening the future existence of the hornbill. See id. at
19-21.
291 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2137-40 (explaining the injury analysis).
2 See id. at 2140-42.
2" For a discussion of the difference between a "generalized grievance" and a
"grievance common to all members of the public," see supra note 114.
' See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("[T]he Court has refrained from
adjudicating.. . 'generalized grievances,' ... most appropriately addressed in the
representative branches.") (citation omitted); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (explaining that decisions to decline to grant
standing in cases of generalized grievances "derive from general prudential concerns
'about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society'"
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Court in Lujan, however, specifically takes this prudential concern-
generalized grievances-and imports it into its constitutional analysis
by interpreting Article III as prohibiting generalized grievances.
295
The Court, quoting from United States v. Richardson,29 6 explained
that a suit which "rested upon an impermissible 'generalized
grievance' ... was inconsistent with the 'framework of Article
III. ' "217 The problem with the Court's use of language from
Richardson is that it completely distorts the language of Richardson.
It is not clear whether the denial of standing in Richardson is
based upon prudential or constitutional grounds. Many sources
argue that the denial was based entirely upon prudential
grounds. 298 If such an interpretation of Richardson is accurate, the
Lujan Court's use of Richardson as evidence that generalized
grievances are inconsistent with Article III is an outright distortion
of precedent. It is arguable, however, that Richardson denied
standing on a constitutional basis.299  Even if the denial is consti-
tutionally motivated, however, Richardson never places generalized
grievances within the framework of an Article III denial of stand-
ing.3°0 The reference to "generalized grievances" 01 is stated in
a different context than the reference to "Article Ir."12  The
Court in Lujan, by taking unrelated quotations from Richardson and
magically connecting them, imports the traditionally prudential
worry of generalized grievances into Article III limitations.
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
29 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2144.
- 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
2 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 171, 176).
' See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80 (citing Richardson in support of the fact that a
"generalized grievance" raises "prudential concerns"); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975) (citing Richardson for the proposition that a "generalized grievance" is
"[alpart from the minimum constitutional mandate"); see also Logan, supra note 22,
at 50 n.58 (describing the holding in Richardson as "a denial of standing because
plaintiffs' generalized grievances violated prudential rules").
2 Arguably, the plaintiff's challenge-that the withholding of detailed information
on CIA expenditures unconstitutionally prevents the plaintiff from properly fulfilling
"his obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for candidates seeking
national office," Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176-is common to all members of the public
and, hence, constitutionally precluded by Article III.
mn Nowhere in Richardson does the Court state that federal courts should not hear
generalized grievances because Article III prohibits it.
so' Id. at 176.
m Id. at 171.
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b. Inconsistent Imminence
The Court in Lujan held that the plaintiffs were not returning
soon enough to the foreign countries to satisfy the imminence
requirement 08  This denial of standing becomes especially
troublesome when one considers Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.!0 4 In Lucas, the plaintiff purchased two beachfront lots
in South Carolina in 1986.05 In 1988, the state enacted a coastal
regulation which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent
structures on his lots. °6 He filed suit against the state, alleging
that the state violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights! °7 The Court held that he should be granted judicial ac-
cess."' It is difficult to reconcile the Court's finding in Lucas here
that the imminence requirement was satisfied with the denial of
such a finding in Lujan. Although Lucas brought his suit in 1988,
the "trial court made no findings of fact that Lucas had any plans
to use the property from 1988 to 1990. " "°0 Indeed Lucas himself
testified "that he was 'in no hurry' to build 'because the lot was
appreciating in value.'" 1 ° Lucas brought suit in 1988 but the
governmental regulations which barred Lucas from erecting
structures on his lots did not affect Lucas until 1990-the year that
he first planned to build upon his lots. The point is that Lucas had
standing to sue in 1988 even though he would not be injured until
1990. l1 The Court held that his injury was sufficiently imminent.
In contrast, the plaintiffs in Lujan, whose injury the dissent
characterized as occurring "soon," did not satisfy the imminence
requirement
1 2
Once again, the Court is importing what should be nonconstitu-
tional considerations into its constitutional analysis. It is plausible
that the Court did not find the Defenders of Wildlife members'
injuries to be imminent and did find Mr. Lucas's injury to be
' In contrast, the dissent explained that the plaintiffs would "soon return to the
project sites...." Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3" 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
305 See id. at 2887.
306 See id.
307 See id.
"s See id. at 2891.
' Id. at 2908 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10 Id.
3" As the dissent explains, it is "baffling," given Lujan, that the plaintiff in Lucas
"has demonstrated injury in fact." Id.
3
12 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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imminent based on the prudential concern of internationalism
rather than the appropriate question of imminence. Lucas's
challenge affected activity in South Carolina,"'3 while Skilbred's
challenge affected activity in Sri Lanka.114  Ms. Skilbred's chal-
lenge to the overseas activity raised a concern that a judicial
resolution could offend a foreign nation. No such concern was at
stake in Lucas. 15 While the Court in Lujan never explicitly
pointed to an international concern in its decision, it did implicitly
import such concerns, raising the constitutional limits.3 16  It
explained that a plaintiff "who observes or works with animals of a
particular species in the very area of the world where that species
is threatened by a federal decision" may have standing to challenge
the threatening activity, but a plaintiff who works with a species that
resides in a different area of the world does not have standing.
317
The Court seems acutely aware that "requiring federal agencies
acting abroad to comply with the consultation requirements of
section 7 would interfere with the sovereignty of foreign na-
tions."1 s  Furthermore, the dissent, recognizing the implicit
international concerns present in the Court's opinion, referred to
the Court's reasoning as "geographic formalism."
3 19
This Comment does not propose that the Court ignore interna-
tional concerns when analyzing a question of standing. Often, the
' See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2887.
314 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
15 The Court in Lucas did attempt to distinguish Lujan on other grounds by
claiming that each case arrived at a different procedural stage. "Lujan, since it
involved the establishment of injury-in-fact at the summaty judgment stage, required
specific facts to be adduced by sworn testimony .... " Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892 n.3.
Conversely, Lucas arrived at the Court on the pleadings and only required "allegations
of fact." Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 65
(1987) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
There are two problems with the Court's reasoning. First, Lucas did not arrive
on the pleadings. "Lucas had a full trial on his claim...." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2908
n.5 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Second, even if Lucas did arrive on the pleadings, the
Court often requires a burden of persuasion that will satisfy summaryjudgment while
the case is still at the pleadings stage. For example, although EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 44-
46, arrived at the Supreme Court on the pleadings, "the Court inverted normal
pleading presumptions by refusing to allow normal inferences to be drawn from
general allegations." Nichol, supra note 6, at 72 n.25.
" See Nichol, supra note 38, at 1165 (noting that "Justice Scalia raised the barriers
of the case or controversy requirement merely to limit the geographical confines of
the Endangered Species Act").
31 7 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2139-40.
"I Henry J. Blum, The Extraterritorial Application of Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, 13 CoLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 129, 132 (1987).
319Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Court has rightfully denied judicial access because such a grant
would arouse international tensions.121 Instead, the Court should
include concern for international relations in its prudential
analysis, 21 not in its constitutional analysis of whether there exists
an imminent injury. The consequence of such an inclusion into the
constitutional analysis is that the courts and Congress, neither of
which can overcome a constitutional barrier to standing, will not be
able to grant standing to plaintiffs who satisfy previous constitution-
al obstacles and who do not implicate international concerns.
Even if the Court in Lujan were correct in holding that the
plaintiffs' unspecified date of return failed to satisfy the imminence
requirement, there is an additional problem with the Court's
analysis. Generally, when a court decides a question of imminence
in environmental cases, it should focus on the imminence of the
harm to the environment rather than the imminence of the harm to
the particular plaintiff.122 Yet the Court in Lujan measured the
imminence with respect to the litigant and not with respect to the
environment. The plaintiffs alleged an injury to their vocational
and aesthetic interests in observing certain endangered species. 
2
3
Instead of focusing on how soon the species would become extinct,
the Court focused on when the plaintiffs "inten[ded] to return" to
the places where they had previously studied these species. 24 The
Court required "concrete plans" which would demonstrate the
plaintiffs' intentions to return at some specified date.
325
s2o See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423 (1964) (expressing
the idea that judicial interference with foreign acts "may hinder rather than further
this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations"); see
also GARY B. BoRN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COuRTS 68 (1989) ("Assertions of personal jurisdiction over foreigners may
also arouse foreign resentment or interfere with U.S. foreign relations.").
1
21 See infra note 392 and accompanying text (discussing the propriety of including
international concerns as part of the prudential analysis).
"2 Justice Stevens agrees that "the 'imminence' of... an [environmental] injury
should be measured by the timing and likelihood of the threatened environnental
harm, rather than ... by the time that might elapse between the present and the time
when the individuals would visit the area if no such injury should occur." Lujan, 112
S. Ct. at 2148 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Sierra Club v.
Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1418 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the relevant inquiry is
whether there is an "imminent threat to [the] wilderness"); Respondents' Brief at 24,
Lujan (No. 90-1424) (arguing that the imminence of the "date of [the plaintiff's]
return is irrelevant" because "if the endangered species are eradicated.... they will
be gone for the rest of time").
323 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2137.
324 Id. at 2138.
3
25 Id.
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The Court's imminence analysis is illogical. It is self-evident that
the plaintiffs' injury "will occur as soon as the animals are de-
stroyed." 26 The case of Gilmore v. Utah-27 lucidly illustrates this
point. In Gilmore, Gary Gilmore's mother challenged the state's
decision to execute her son. 21 Mrs. Gilmore satisfied the consti-
tutional standing requirements. 29 Yet one of the absurd conclu-
sions that can be drawn from Lujan is that Mrs. Gilmore may no
longer satisfy the imminence requirement. Presumably, the Court
would measure imminence not by the timing of the execution
(analogous to the death of an endangered species) but rather by the
timing of Mrs. Gilmore's intent to visit her son (analogous to the
time when the Lujan plaintiffs next intended to see the endangered
species). If Mrs. Gilmore possessed merely the intention to visit her
son without any evidence of concrete plans, then she would be
denied standing to challenge the impending death of her son due
to the lack of an imminent injury.3 ' Surely this cannot be the
correct result. The Court's requirement of concrete travel plans to
prove imminence goes against logic.
The Court might respond to this criticism by arguing that it
required concrete plans to satisfy the constitutional requirement of
a personal stake rather than to satisfy the constitutional requirement
of imminence. After all, a plaintiff who has imminent plans to
travel to Sri Lanka to observe endangered species most likely has a
greater personal stake than the common public. Two problems
exist with this argument. First, the Court makes it quite clear that
its requirement of concrete travel plans relates directly to the
'26 Id. at 2148 (Stevens, J., concurring).
327 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
328 See id. at 1013.
" The Court actually denied standing to Mrs. Gilmore, but, as Gene Nichol,Jr.,
argues, "[c]learly... [t]he injuries she sustained as the result of her son's death
would more than meet the dictates of article I." Nichol, supra note 6, at 97.
Instead, Mrs. Gilmore was denied standing due to "[p]rinciples of third party
standing." Id.
0 In LujanJustice Blackmun, in dissent, pokes fun at the plurality's formalistic
imminence requirement. For example, he wonders if "a Federal Torts Claims Act
plaintiff alleging loss of consortium should make sure to furnish this Court with a
'description of concrete plans' for her nightly schedule of attempted activities."
Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Similarly, one wonders if a
mother such as Mrs. Gilmore must outline and furnish specific plans to visit her son,
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would actually hold that either Mrs.
Gilmore or the Federal Torts Claims Act plaintiff would fail to satisfy the imminence
requirement. The point of both examples is to illustrate potential flaws in the Court's
articulation of the standard.
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imminence test: "[S]uch 'some day' intentions-without any
description of concrete plans ... do not support a finding of the
'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require.""8 ' Second, even
if the requirement of concrete plans were part of the Court's
personal stake analysis, there is no reason to assume that a person
could not allege a personal stake merely because she does not
possess evidence of imminent plans to travel to a foreign country.
Mitigating factors can arise that obviate her concrete plans. For
example, in Lujan, Ms. Skilbred was not able to make travel plans
to go to Sri Lanka because "'[t]here [was] a civil war going on.'
8 832
Moreover, she did establish other factors-her past trip to Sri Lanka,
her fixed intent to return and her vocational duties involving the
threatened speciesS8 -- which should have satisfied the personal stake
requirement."8 4 "[A] person who has visited ... an endangered
species, has a professional interest in preserving the species and its
habitat, and intends to revisit [the species] in the future has
standing to challenge agency action that threatens their destruc-
tion.""8 5 Indeed, it seems Ms. Skilbred has shown a personal
stake.
Once again, the Court appears to be expanding its constitutional
analysis beyond the three-pronged constitutional requirements.
Because many people might have a personal stake in an endangered
species,"8 6 the Court could have denied standing for prudential
reasons.817  Instead, it suggested that in hearing "generalized
grievance" cases where several people have a stake,8 3 such as
Lujan, courts "would be discarding a principle fundamental to the
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch" by
hearing the case and therefore must deny standing on Article III
831 Id. at 2138.
"52 Id. (quoting the deposition of Amy Skilbred). Similarly, Mrs. Gilmore would
probably not have evidence of plans to see her son.
-'- See supra notes 1-3, 5 and accompanying text (proving Ms. Skilbred's personal
stake in the species's preservation).
- See Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, 'Lujan' 'Lucas' and Dague.: A
Scalian Trilogy, N.Y. LJ., July 31, 1992, at 3, 27 (explaining the possibility that "the
ongoing professional concern of two members of the plaintiff... was sufficient to
confer standing").
3
5 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Stevens, J., concurring).
336 See id. at 2139.
3" See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (explaining that the fact that
many people have a stake in something points toward a prudential denial of standing,
not a constitutional denial).
3
-s Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2144.
HOW STANDING HAS FALLEN
grounds."3 9 Because such separation of powers concerns should
be irrelevant when considering the Article III test, 4 ' they should
be a part of the prudential analysis and, thus, properly eliminated
from the constitutional doctrine.
2. Redressability
After importing what should be prudential concerns into the
injury requirement, the plurality in Lujan proceeded to do the same
to the redressability requirement. The Court held that the
plaintiffs' requested remedy-a declaratory judgment forcing the
Secretary to revise his regulations to require consultation on foreign
projects which threatened endangered species-would not redress
the environmental injury. 4' The Court explained that even if the
Secretary were forced to promulgate a regulation requiring
consultation, there was no guarantee that the agencies, which were
not parties to the suit, would be required to honor such a regula-
tion: "[The Secretary] could be ordered to revise his regulation to
require consultation for foreign projects. But this would not
remedy [plaintiffs'] alleged injury unless the funding agencies were
bound [to consult] by the Secretary's regulation, which is very much
an open question."3 4 The Court even concluded that "any relief
the District Court could have provided in this suit against the
Secretary was not likely to produce" results that would redress the
plaintiffs' injury.
43
It is very difficult to reconcile this portion of the Lujan decision
with Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.144 In Hill, the Tennessee
Valley Authority, a wholly-owned public corporation of the United
States, built a dam which would, upon completion, impound water
covering 16,500 acres.3 45 In the process of building the dam, it
was discovered that completion of the dam would seriously
jeopardize the future existence of the snail darter, an endangered
species.3 4' The plaintiffs brought an action under the ESA3 47 in
S59 Id. at 2144-45.
' See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text (explaining how the importation
of separation of powers issues can distort the three-pronged analysis). The Court's
importation in this instance distorts the personal stake analysis.
341 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-42.
m2 Id. at 2140.
"3 Id. at 2142.
" 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
M See id. at 157.
so See id. at 161-62. The snail darter was deemed legally endangered prior to the
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order to enjoin the dam's completion. 4 8 The Court stated that
the legislative history of Section 7 of the ESA "reveals an explicit
congressional decision to require agencies to afford first priority to
the declared national policy of saving endangered species."
3 49
Accordingly, it interpreted Section 7 as mandating the agencies to
fulfill the statute's procedural requirements. s 0
The Court in Hill and the Court in Lujan examined the same
statute yet disagreed on its interpretation. The Hill Court read
Section 7(a)(2) as requiring an agency to consult, 5 1 while the
Lujan Court saw the consultation issue as permitting the agencies
to have an option.35 2 The problem with the Lujan interpretation
is that it ignored the actual mandate of the defendant himself. The
Secretary's regulation states that "[a]ll Federal actions including
'conservation programs' are subject to the consultation require-
ments of 7(a)(2)."3 5 3 The discussion accompanying the promulga-
tion of the consultation regulation further shows the Secretary's
intent, stating that the Secretary "believes that uniform consultation
... procedures are necessary. "314 He cannot publicly state, at one
plaintiffs' suit but after the TVA began construction of the dam. See id. at 161.
4 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
" See Hill, 437 U.S. at 164.
39 Id. at 185.
o See id. at 185 n.31. Actually, the Court in Hill takes the analysis even further.
It never explicitly discusses the agencies' procedural duties under § 7. Instead, it
reasons that once agencies have consulted with the Secretary, thereby fulfilling the
procedural requirements of§ 7, the agencies have an affirmative, substantive duty "to
give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal agencies." Id.
at 185. Indeed, the reason that the Court never explicitly discussed whether or not
an agency has a duty to consult the Secretary in the first place is that the defendants
conceded that agencies must consult. The defendants focused on the degree to which
agencies had to obey the consultation requirement-not whether there was ever a
consultation requirement. The defendants, while arguing that an agency "would not
be prohibited from [jeopardizing an endangered species] if they deemed it necessary
to do so," still conceded that § 7 "would require consultation." Id. at 185 n.31. The
issue in Hill concerned the agencies' responsibility once they had already consulted
with the Secretary. There was never even an issue as to whether the agencies had to
consult in the first place.
351 See id; see also Blum, supra note 318, at 131 n.20 (noting several situations
where an agency is required to consult).
"52 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-41.
s 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,929 (1986).
3 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,928 (1986). Additionally, appeals courts have made it
plain that consultation is mandatory. Agencies may only make a decision after they
have fulfilled their § 7 procedural duties. See e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Coleman, 529 F. 2d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that "[f]ederal agencies are
required to consult and obtain the assistance of the Secretary before taking any
HOW STANDING HAS FALLEN
point in time, that uniform consultation procedures are required of
the agencies and then, "for the convenience of this appeal, ...
disavow his prior public... position[]. " 55
It seems relatively clear that if the Secretary himself interprets
Section 7(a)(2) as requiring an agency to consult, then that agency
must consult. Therefore, a Supreme Court remedy that requires the
Secretary to expand the scope of section 7(a)(2) consultations to
include agency action affecting foreign projects would necessarily
redress the plaintiffs' injury: lack of consultation on foreign
projects. Furthermore, the argument that the requested remedy in
Lujan passes constitutional muster becomes even stronger when one
considers that the injury is to a procedural right-the right to
consultation. 56 As the Court in Lujan admits, a "person who has
been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests
can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressabfity."
5 7
If the Court were solely considering the constitutional require-
ment of redressability, then the Court probably would have
acknowledged that the plaintiffs satisfied the constitutional
requirement. Once again, however, the Court imported other
factors into the Article III limits. One major difference between
Lujan and Hill is that Hill affected an action in Tennessee while
Lujan affected an action on foreign soil. The Court may again be
including international concerns in its constitutional analysis.
After the Court explained that it was an open question whether
or not the federal agencies would consult with the Secretary, it
proceeded to explain that even if the agencies did consult, it was
still not likely that the plaintiffs' environmental injuries would be
redressed. Since agency money provided only "10% of the fund-
ing," there was no guarantee that a termination of American
funding would terminate the foreign projects that threaten
endangered species.5 ' However, the Court ignored the fact that
many foreign governments had requested the assistance of Ameri-
actions").
3
55 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2155 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3-56 See id. at 2142.
57 Id. at 2142 n.7. In the Lujan case, the purpose of the consultation itself is to
attempt to discern the environmental consequences of the proposed federal action.
Requiring the plaintiff to make a significant showing of redressability on a procedural
injury requires the plaintiff to "show much of what she claims shouldbe investigated"
by the consultation procedure itself. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 259.
" See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2142.
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can agencies in funding projects, and these projects might not be
able to continue without American support." 9 "[I]t is not mere
speculation to think that foreign governments, when faced with the
threatened withdrawal of United States assistance, will modify their
projects to mitigate the harm to endangered species."
3 60
It is difficult to explain the Court's reasoning regarding the
redressability issue in Lujan when one considers that the Court
found that the plaintiffs in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 61 demonstrated a causal link
between the remedy and the injury. In SCRAP, a group of law
students tried to enjoin a railroad freight rate increase approved by
the Interstate Commerce Commission, basing their claim upon the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA). 62 The plaintiffs
argued that the following chain of causation would lead to injury:
the railroad would illegally increase its freight rate, the rate increase
would discourage recycling (because recycled goods were transport-
ed on the railroad), the discouragement of recycling would lead to
a decline in recycled goods, the decline in recycled goods would
lead to an increase in litter, the increase in litter would lead to
greater pollution, the greater pollution would decrease the quality
of the air, the decreased air quality would harm the plaintiffs'
interest in breathing unpolluted air. 6 Despite the "attenuated
line of causation to the eventual injury, " '" the Court still granted
standing.
365
One could defend Lujan by claiming that SCRAP artificially
lowered the constitutional redressability requirement. Indeed, many
commentators have been very critical of the SCRAP decision.
3 66
... See id. at 2157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 2149 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 2157 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the withdrawal of American funding could "affect foreign
government conduct sufficiently to avoid harm to listed species").
36412 U.S. 669 (1973).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The SCRAP complaint was
based upon an alleged violation by the ICC of § 4332(2)(C), which requires an
environmental impact statement for legislation "affecting the quality of the human
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
m See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 676, 678.
SId. at 688.
See id. at 690. One could argue that the Court only granted standing because
of the decreased evidentiary requirements at the pleadings stage. However, the Court
has tended to require a level that will satisfy summary judgment although the case is
still at the pleadings stage. See supra note 315.
m See DAvIs, supra note 6, §24:30 at 324 ("If the Court were focused on creating
law of standing that is rational and stable ... it probably would have denied standing
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Nonetheless, Lujan itself does not seem to regard SCRAP as bad
law. 67 More importantly, Justice Scalia specifically used SCRAP to
support a grant of standing while he was still with the District of
Columbia Circuit. In Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus,168 a
group of plaintiffs challenged an action by the EPA which tempo-
rarily permitted General Motors to exceed maximum pollution
emissions standards under the Clean Air Act 69 for cars already in
use. Like the plaintiffs in SCRAP, the plaintiffs in Center alleged an
injury to their interest in breathing clean air. Scalia granted
standing by relying upon SCRAP. He dismissed the standing issue
in a footnote:
The [plaintiffs] include two... not-for-profit organizations...
and three private individuals .... The latter three assert that they
are 'concerned about, and breathe[], pollutants in the ambient air'
that would be increased by the agency action at issue .... [T]hese
petitioners come within the broad grant of standing announced by
the Supreme Court for such cases.
370
It is unlikely that the Lujan Court, in an opinion also written by
Justice Scalia, interprets SCRAP as totally bad law.17 ' This leaves
one to wonder why the plaintiffs in SCRAP and Center received
standing while the plaintiff in Lujan, who alleged a far less attenuat-
ed link to redressability, did not receive standing. Once more, the
Court appears to be weighing factors beyond the proper scope of
the constitutional analysis.
in SCRAP."); Chayes, supra note 6, at 20 ("[Bly no stretch of the imagination can it
be said that the relief requested ... would necessarily result in lower rates.");
Fletcher, supra note 6, at 259 ("SCRAP has come to be regarded as something of a
sport.").
" Lujan actually uses SCRAP to support a proposition. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at
2139 (citing SCRAP for the proposition that a plaintiff's harm must be perceptible).
Admittedly, Lujan does not rely upon SCRAP's reasoning. Nonetheless, if the Court
in Lujan strongly disagreed with SCRAP, it could have used several other cases to
support the proposition regarding the perceptibility of the plaintiff's harm. See, e.g.,
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,501 (1975) (injury must be "distinct and palpable"); see
also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (similar analysis); Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (similar analysis).
747 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).
See id. at 3; see also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 207, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7541 (1988) (legislating compliance by vehicles and engines in actual use).
370 Center, 747 F.2d at 3 n.2 (citation omitted).
371 One could argue that Scalia, only a circuit court judge at the time, had no
choice but to follow a Supreme Court standing decision. Even so, it seems that
Scalia's attitude toward SCRAP is not entirely negative. See Perino, supra note 286,
at 163-66 (discussing Scalia's ambiguous stance toward SCRAP).
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C. What Makes a Concern Prudential
As discussed earlier, the justification behind the Article III
standing barriers should be limited to the assurance of zealous
advocacy. 72 Other concerns such as separation of powers should
not be encompassed by a constitutional doctrine because the courts
and Congress must be given the chance to weigh factors which
mitigate against the typical denial of standing in the presence of
these other concerns. 37 The three-pronged constitutional test
simply does not support other concerns. Consider, for example, the
bad fit between the constitutional test and the promotion of
internationalism. In Lujan, the Court reasoned that the injury to
the plaintiff was not imminent enough to confer standing. It has
already been shown how the imminence requirement that the Court
outlined may very well have been influenced by international con-
cerns. " 4 Presumably the Court was hesitant to render a decision
that would have a significant effect upon a foreign country's
sovereignty.7 5 International concerns, however, should be com-
pletely independent of the imminence requirement. If Ms. Skilbred
had a plane ticket to Sri Lanka reserved for the next day, she most
likely would have satisfied the Court's imminence requirement.-
76
Nevertheless, a decision which grants standing in this hypothetical
case would contain just as many international implications as a
decision which grants standing to the actual plaintiff. .A grant of
standing to the hypothetical plaintiff is no less likely to intrude
upon the foreign project than is a grant of standing in the actual
case. The imminence of the injury to the plaintiff bears no
relationship to the concern that the American judicial system is
infringing on foreign countries.
The redressability requirement likewise is unrelated to interna-
tional concerns. If the plaintiffs in Lujan had been able to show
-" See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
373 See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text (explaining how the inclusion of
concerns such as separation of powers into the Article III analysis erroneously
increases the constitutional barrier to standing, thereby preventing courts and
Congress from weighing countervailing factors).
-74 See supra notes 303-19 and accompanying text (explaining that the different
results in Lujan and Lucas are a result of the Court's importation of international
concerns).
s7s See Blum, sura note 318, at 132 (noting that the Secretary has argued against
the application of § 7 to agencies acting abroad due to international worries).
31
6 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2138 (requiring a "specification" of when Ms. Skilbred
intended to return to Sri Lanka in order to establish injury).
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that the offending agency would definitely consult with the
Secretary, and that this consultation would result in the elimination
of any dangerous foreign construction projects, their injuries very
likely would have been deemed redressable. This clearly redressable
injury, however, would not mitigate the Court's concerns about
infringing upon a foreign country's construction projects. Again, a
grant of standing in the hypothetical case is no less likely to intrude
upon foreign projects than is a grant of standing in the actual
case.
377
Similar analyses could be performed upon the Court's other
imported nonconstitutional factors to reveal that they too are
independent of injury and redressabiity. "In short, the [constitu-
tional] tests formulated by the Supreme Court over the past quarter-
century have been designed to measure the interest of the liti-
gant."78 Like internationalism and separation of powers, 79 the
concerns of federalism8 0 and military deference38' are unrelated
to the constitutional test.
If these four concerns are not part of the Article M analysis,
then the question arises whether these concerns should even be
considered as part of the prudential analysis.3 8 2  Prudential
limitations encompass those concerns which suggest deference to
s" If anything, it would seem that the more redressable injury is actually more of
an encroachment on a foreign nation's authority. A truly redressable injury by
definition requires that a remedy exists which will result in the cessation of the
foreign country's project. Such a hypothetical remedy is more likely to arouse
international angers than a remedy of lesser redressability that does not necessarily
cease the foreign country's projects.
5 7sNichol, supra note 33, at 647.
s See supra notes 47-67.
's Consider a plaintiff who suffers a concrete, redressable injury at the hands of
a state actor performing a core state function. Clearly, the plaintiff passes
constitutional muster. Nonetheless, a grant of standing to this plaintiff would not
alleviate federalism concerns any more than would a grant of standing to an
uninjured plaintiff with no redressability who sues a state actor. Concerns over
federalism are just as likely to be present whether or not the plaintiff satisfies the
Article III requirements. See supra note 67 (explaining the poor fit between
federalism and the three-pronged test).
381 Consider a plaintiff who suffers a concrete, redressable injury at the hands of
the military during a time of war. This plaintiff satisfies Article Ill. Again, a grant
of standing to this plaintiff would not implicate military concerns any less than would
a grant of standing to an uninjured plaintiff who sues the military. Concerns over
military deference arejust as likely to be present whether or not the plaintiff satisfies
the Article I requirements.
' Recall that the standing requirement has two components-prudential and
constitutional. See supra note 22-24 and accompanying text. If a concern is neither
constitutional nor prudential, it should not be part of the standing question at all.
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"matter[s] of judicial self-restraint.""'8 The relevant question is
not whether the court should consider the concern at all. Rather,
the court must ask itself whether merely hearing the case implicates
this concern, 84 since "standing is a preliminary jurisdictional
requirement. "885 If so, the concern is properly prudential. If not,
the court should only consider that concern if it hears the case on
the merits.
Consider the concern of military deference. Courts will
sometimes defer to the military when deciding cases involving
military issues. 86  Courts are reluctant, particularly in times of
war, to suppress military judgment."8 7 Courts should consider this
concern, however, only after it is clear that the plaintiffs have
standing. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,11
the Court seems to unnecessarily import concerns of military
deference into its preliminary jurisdictional analysis. 89  Since
merely hearing the case would not have harmed the military,3
9 0
13 WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 3531, at 345.
'a See id. (noting that prudential concerns relate to whether "it seems wise not to
entertain the case"). A nonconstitutional concern that does not relate to the question
of whether it seems prudent to hear the case is not a prudential concern and
therefore should be removed entirely from the standing analysis.
International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research,
Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987), provides an
interesting example of a prudential concern. In Primate, the court denied standing
to plaintiffs alleging injury under the Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-
2159 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The plaintiffs attempted to enjoin the National
Institutes of Health from allowing future noxious treatment to a group of experimen-
tal monkeys. The court denied standing, however, because merely hearing the case
"might open the use of animals in biomedical research to the hazards and vicissitudes
of courtroom litigation." Primate, 799 F.2d at 935. For a critical analysis of this
decision, see Klauber, supra note 87.
Fletcher, supra note 6, at 223.
'6 For examples of such cases, see infra note 390.
' See supra note 221 (discussing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944)); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (holding that
congressional and executive action was constitutional because it "must be appraised
in the light of the [wartime] conditions"); DILLON S. MYER, UPROOTED AMERICANS 259
(1971) (discussing the probable constitutionality of issues that "could be considered
to be a military necessity").
418 U.S. 208 (1974).
..9 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text (discussing how Schlesinger
probably imported military concerns into the constitutional analysis).
" There is no evidence to suggest that merely hearing Schlesinger, a case
concerning the constitutionality of allowing members of Congress to be in the
military reserve, would adversely affect the military. In fact, the Court often uses the
merits to defer explicitly to the military in times of war. See e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S.
at 214,233-34 (upholding the constitutionality of a presidential executive order issued
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the Court could have addressed these concerns on the merits.
When hearing the case does not, in and of itself, implicate concerns
for military deference, these concerns should not be assimilated into
the standing analysis.
Military deference, however, should be distinguished from the
concerns of federalism, separation of powers, and internationalism.
Whereas merely hearing the case does not implicate concerns about
proper deference owed to the military, hearing the case does, for
example, implicate concerns about proper deference owed to state
governments. When a federal court grants standing in a case that
involves state actors, it automatically places the fate of the state
actors under the control of the federal judiciary. Merely allowing
a part of the federal government to determine the fate of state
officials implicates concerns of federalism. "[R]ecognition of the
need for a proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal
and state [governments] counsels restraint" against the federal
courts hearing cases involving state officers. 91 Standing's pruden-
tial limitations must account for concerns about federalism.
A similar restraint is necessary for cases that implicate concerns
about internationalism and separation of powers. As for interna-
tionalism, merely hearing a case could potentially inflame interna-
tional tensions. 92 Consequently, the prudential limits should take
into account such concerns. Similarly, merely hearing a case could
create separation of powers concerns. Courts usually deny standing
to "generalized grievances" because such grievances typically affect
enough of the population that they would be more appropriately
redressed by the representative branch than by the unelected
judiciary."' Merely hearing the case allows the courts to assume
a role which is more properly assumed by Congress. The prudential
limits of standing may properly consider separation of powers
during World War II that forced Japanese Americans to evacuate their homes);
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 (sustaining a World War II curfew order that required all
persons ofJapanese ancestry to remain in their homes after 8 p.m.).
'g' O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974).
59 See supra notes 318, 320 and accompanying text (noting the judicial concern
for avoiding arousal of international tensions).
S. See Logan, supra note 23, at 47 ("In a democracy, questions that aggrieve large
portions of the people are best handled by their elected representatives, who possess
political legitimacy as well as the special factfinding and policymaking capabilities
necessary to address broad questions of public policy."); Poisner, supra note 25, at 355
(explaining that "some injuries are so widely shared" thatjudicial review is inappropri-
ate); supra note 294 and accompanying text (citing cases which discuss the proper role
of the Court in a democratic society).
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concerns and thereby "minimize the role of the judiciary in a
democratic society.
"394
As the preceding discussion indicates, concerns about separation
of powers, federalism, and internationalism do have a proper place
in the standing analysis. However, because these concerns distort
the constitutional part of the standing analysis, they should be
considered only in the prudential part of the analysis. By routinely
importing these concerns into the constitutional analysis, the Court
has created a number of damaging consequences.
III. CONSEQUENCES
A. Harm to Courts
While prudential considerations often militate in favor of
judicial restraint, "countervailing considerations may outweigh the
concerns underlying the usual [prudential] reluctance to exert
judicial power." 95 Since the courts have no discretion to override
constitutional limits,.9 6 Supreme Court decisions, which import
what should be prudential considerations into the constitutional
analysis, deprive the courts of the opportunity to weigh the
countervailing considerations. The result is a call for judicial
restraint in virtually all circumstances.
A question arises as to whether the increased constitutional
limits actually decrease judicial discretion. After all, although the
importation of prudential concerns into the constitutional mix will
theoretically decrease discretion, it may seem that the lower courts
would still be able to distinguish cases where factors such as
internationalism or federalism are implicated from cases where such
factors are not implicated. The case law, however, suggests
otherwise. The lower courts seem unwilling to override increased
constitutional limits, despite the presence of factors which alleviate
the normal concern over a grant of standing.
In American Postal Workers Union v. Frank,9 7 a labor union
waged a Fourth Amendment challenge to a U.S. Postal Service
policy that called for mandatory drug testing of job applicants"9 8
S9 Poisner, supra note 25, at 354.
... Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
' See supra note 25 and accompanying text (giving sources which explain that
courts can grant standing only if Article III permits).
-17 968 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1992).
398 See id. at 1374.
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The union asked for declaratory and injunctive relief that would
prevent the Postal Service from future testing."' The court
denied standing,00 relying in part on City of Los Angeles v. Ly-
ons.4" 1 It held that while the union members may have claims for
damages due to the coerced testing they already endured, there is
no case or controversy with respect to the future possibility of
coercion. "[P]ast exposure to harm will not ... confer standing
upon a litigant to obtain equitable relief '[a]bsent a sufficient
likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.
' "'402
The union attempted to distinguish its case from Lyons by
pointing to the fact that the future injury in Lyons-an illegal
chokehold-was unlikely to recur whereas the future injury in
Frank-a coerced drug test-was extremely likely to recur because the
Postal Service continued to impose preemployment drug testing on
job applicants. The court responded that since the plaintiff union
was composed only of current employees, none of its members
faced any likelihood of future exposure to illegal conduct. "Because
the drug testing policy is applied only to job applicants, no Union
member faces a realistic risk of future exposure to it."
403
The court's comparison to Lyons is a valid one. The probability
that the union's members would face coerced testing in the future
was probably no greater than the probability that Lyons would face
future chokeholds. Nevertheless, as previously demonstrated, the
possibility of future injury to Lyons actually may have been
substantial.0 4 Similarly, Postal Service practices suggest that the
plaintiff's members could quite easily be exposed to future coercion.
Since the union represents some employees who were not tested
before they were hired,0 5 and since the Postal Service "consistent-
ly imposes" a policy of testing all employees at one time or anoth-
er,40 it is more than speculative that the untested members of the
399 See id.
00 See id. at 1378.
401 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
402 Frank, 968 F.2d at 1376 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111).
40 Id. at 1377.
404 See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text (citing evidence that the injury
to the plaintiff in Lyons was not speculative).
" See Frank, 968 F.2d at 1374 (noting that "[s]ome of [the union's members]
underwent drug testing before they were hired"). The fact that only some members
underwent testing before they were hired implies that some members did not
undergo testing before they were hired.
406 Id. at 1377. While it is true that the Postal Service tested only job applicants,
none of whom were in the union, the fact that the Postal Service performs "drug
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plaintiff union" may be mandatorily tested some day. These
members probably will be tested eventually but will be deprived of
the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the testing.
One cannot fault the First Circuit for its decision. If the
Supreme Court in Lyons could hold that the injury to Lyons was too
speculative to pass constitutional muster, then it is certainly
reasonable for the circuit court in Frank to hold that the injury to
its plaintiffs was not sufficiently likely either. The only problem is
that it is completely plausible that Lyons did possess the constitu-
tionally required level.4 °7 Indeed, "[i]t is inconceivable ... that
Lyons asserted no particularized harm.""' The Court imported
federalism into its constitutional analysis, thereby artificially
inflating the constitutional minimum.
The Lyons Court could have both maintained the proper
constitutional level and still denied standing based on federalism
concerns by explicitly relying on this concern in its prudential
analysis. If it had, future courts such as the one in Frank-whose
plaintiffs possess the constitutional minimum-could grant or deny
standing based upon the presence or absence of countervailing
prudential considerations such as federalism. If deference to state
practices suggests a denial of standing, courts could so choose. If,
as the court in Frank explicitly admits, "the issue ... may be more
appropriate for federal court,"419 then the court could grant
standing.40 Lower courts would be able to weigh countervailing
situations. The Lyons decision, however, removed such discretion
from the courts by importing the prudential requirement of
federalism into the constitutional analysis. Since the lower courts
have no discretion with respect to such constitutional limits, the
Supreme Court removed these issues from the purview of the lower
courts. Even though the court in Frank noted that the case might
testing on a daily basis" suggests that the Postal Service could very likely test its
previously untested employees at some time soon. Id. Indeed, the plaintiffs describe
the possibility of "a very real and substantial conflict" with the Postal Service. Id.
o See supra note 236 and accompanying text (explaining that the injury to Lyons
probably satisfied the constitutional requirement).
' Nichol, supra note 6, at 100.
409 Frank, 968 F.2d at 1377 n.5.
410 Presumably the Frank case is more appropriate for the federal courts than
Lyons because the plaintiff is challenging the conduct of a national organization, the
Postal Service, as opposed to a state organization such as the Los Angeles Police
Department. In the case of a national organization, there is no need for deference
to principles of federalism.
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have been more appropriate for federal court because no federalism
concerns were implicated, it still had to deny standing.
411
Just as the Lyons case deprived the Frank court of its power to
examine mitigating factors, the Court in Allen v. Wright412 deprived
the court in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey41 of the same power.
In Gracey, the Haitian Refugee Center ("HRC") brought an action
challenging an executive program which ordered the interdiction of
certain vessels carrying undocumented aliens.414 The HRC claimed
an injury to its interest in dealing with and promoting the well-being
of Haitian refugees. 41' The court denied standing, holding that the
HRC failed to satisfy the redressability prong of the standing
inquiry.
416
The court's reasoning relied quite heavily upon the rationale of
Allen: "With [the analysis of Allen] in mind, . . . it is necessary to
consider whether [the HRC] ha[s] established" redressability.4 v It
should be no surprise, then, that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy this
prong. As established earlier, Allen increased the redressability
requirement by importing into this prong what should be the
prudential concern of separation of powers,418 thereby denying
standing despite the fact that the plaintiffs satisfied traditional
notions of redressability.
19
Similarly, the HRC's claim seems to be redressable. As the
dissent explained, "[t]here can be no doubt that [the HRC's] injury
is fairly traceable to the [government's] actions."42  The HRC's
ability to receive Haitian referrals "was cut off solely because of the
interdiction ... and the relief sought would restore the flow."
42'
411 See Frank, 968 F.2d at 1377 n.5, 1378 (explaining that while the issue at hand
may have been more appropriate for federal court, the federal court system is "'not
the proper forum to press such claims unless the requirements for entry ... are
satisfied'" (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112)).
412 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
413 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
414 See id. at 796.
415 See id. at 799.
416 See id. at 801. Actually, the court specifically discusses causation, but the two
requirements are effectively equivalent. See supra notes 130, 145 and accompanying
text.417 Id. at 806.
418 See supra notes 271-72, 278 and accompanying text (discussing Allen's explicit
importation of separation of powers into Article Ill).
419 See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text (citing evidence that the
plaintiff's injury was probably redressable).
I Id. at 826 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
421I d.
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Incredibly, even the majority admits that statistically it is "rather
farfetched to deny the heavy probability that" the relief sought
would redress the injury.42 2
Despite what appears to be clear redressability, the court denied
standing. Although the court is admittedly unable to undertake a
"pure analy[sis] of [redressability]" 42' due to the constraints of
Allen, these constraints would not be necessarily problematic if the
concern which drove Allen to increase the redressability require-
ment (i.e., separation of powers) also manifested itself in Gracey. It
is at least arguable, though, that these concerns are mitigated in
Gracey.424 The Supreme Court's treatment of redressability in
Allen prevents the lower court from considering such mitigating
factors.
The Frank and Gracey cases illustrate how the Supreme Court's
overreaching constitutional analysis prevents the lower courts from
examining countervailing issues, thereby harming the courts when
these issues militate in favor of granting standing. Moreover, since
Lujan extends the constitutional analysis further than any of its
predecessors into what should be prudential considerations, 425 it
could potentially infringe quite detrimentally upon judicial
discretion. Indeed, the effects of Lujan are already apparent.
When a court has granted standing after Lujan, it has done so
hesitantly.4 26  In Animal Protection Institute of America v. Mosba-
cher,421 the court ultimately did decide to hear the merits, but only
after lengthy deliberation.4 2 In Mosbacher, the plaintiffs, wildlife
protection organizations, sought the invalidation of a permit issued
4
2 Id. at 806.
43 Id. at 803.
424 See id. at 827 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (arguing that amply satisfying the
traditional redressability prong, as the plaintiffs in Gracey do, serves to alleviate any
worries over separation of powers).
" See Snake River Farmers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 9 F.3d 792, 799
(9th Cir. 1993) (Goochever,J., dissenting) ("In Lujan, the Supreme Court heightened
the requirements for an injury sufficient for Article III standing.. . ."); supra notes
286-292 and accompanying text (noting how Lujan imports what should be prudential
concerns into both injury and redressability).
42 See e.g., Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District
of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he case seems out of kilter with
the Supreme Court's recent decision" in Lujan.); see also id. ("[W]e would not jump
out of our chairs in surprise were the Court to reverse the decision.").
799 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1992).
8 See id. at 177 ("[T]he Court concludes (although not without certain misgivings
.), that petitioners.., have standing to oblige the Court to proceed to address the
merits of their claims.").
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by the Secretary of Commerce to an aquarium owner allowing the
owner to import whales from the natural environment.4 29  The
plaintiffs contended that the Secretary violated the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 197240 by failing to make certain factual deter-
minations before issuing the permit."' The organization claimed
an injury to its interest in watching whales in their natural environ-
ment. 2 The court, noting the specific nature of the injury,
granted standing.433 It used a factually similar Supreme Court
decision, Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,43 4
to bolster the proposition that a denial of the opportunity to watch
whales constitutes a cognizable injury. It explained that "Ij]ust a few
terms ago ... the Supreme Court held that 'whale-watchers' . ..
allege a sufficient 'injury in fact'" if they are denied the opportunity
to watch whales.4 5  The court then ultimately granted standing,
noting that the plaintiffs satisfied Lujan's imminence requirement
through the existence of concrete plans.
43 6
However, even though the court granted standing in Mosbacher,
it did so reluctantly43 7 It is at least arguable that a major factor
that influenced the Mosbacher court in its decision to grant standing,
despite its pronounced misgivings, is the remarkable similarity of
Japan Whaling.38 The Mosbacher court's overarching reliance on
a coincidentally similar Supreme Court decision suggests that
without such support the lower courts will not grant standing, due
to a feared lack of discretion.
In Madsen v. Boise State University,439 John Madsen sued the
university claiming that it had illegally discriminated against him on
4 See id. at 175.
16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
See Mosbacher, 799 F. Supp. at 175.
412 See id. at 176.
"I See id. at 177.
4- 478 U.S. 221 (1986). In Japan Whaling, the Supreme Court held that whale
watchers who were similarly situated to those in Mosbacher did have standing to allege
an injury to an interest in watching whales. See id. at 230-31 n.4.
5 Mosbacher, 799 F. Supp. at 176 (quotingJapan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 231 n.4).
See id. at 177 (holding that the plaintiffs "meet the test" for proving
imminence). The court, in establishing this point, noted just how specific the
plaintiffs' plans were. See id. ("Doncaster plans to watch belugas 'this summer';
Morlan plans to take students to watch belugas in the 'summers of 1993 and 1994';
and Nancy Daves plans to visitJapan to watch false killer whales 'this summer.'").
47 See supra note 428 and accompanying text.
See Mosbacher, 799 F. Supp. at 176 (noting that plaintiffs in both cases were
"whale-watchers").
9 976 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1992).
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the basis of a handicap.4 4 ° While some non-handicap parking
spots on campus did not require a permit, and therefore were free
of charge, every handicap spot on campus did require both a permit
and a fee." Madsen made several phone calls to the parking
services office to inquire about the possibility of obtaining a free
permit and was told none were available." 2 Madsen then sued the
university. On appeal, the court held that Madsen did not have
standing to bring the suit,4" reasoning that since the plaintiff had
never formally applied for a free permit, he could not be adequately
distinguished from those who wanted to see the law correctly
resolved for its own sake.444 "The formal application... presents
a bright line separating those who have suffered from the chal-
lenged policy and those who have not."445 However, Madsen
could be clearly distinguished from the general population without
the requirement of an application and therefore should have been
granted standing.4 4 He called the university several times asking
for a free spot and "was told he would have to pay the fee." 447 It
is not clear why formally applying for a spot would distinguish
Madsen any more than calling several times and asking for a spot
over the phone.
It is difficult to miss the influence of Lujan on Madsen. Lujan
required the plaintiff to show "concrete plans" which amounted to
an exact "specification of when the some day [for a return trip] will
be."448  Madsen required the plaintiff to make a "concrete re-






44' Id. at 1222. The court used the formal application as the means of verifying
personal stake.
The majority would argue with this assertion, as it cited Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-71 (1972) for the proposition that a "plaintiff who had
never applied for membership lacked standing to challenge [a] fraternal organiza-
tion's discriminatory membership policies." Madsen, 976 F.2d at 1220.
However, as the dissent points out, "'there was no evidence that [the plaintiff in
Moose Lodge] wanted to be a moose; not everyone does.'" Id. at 1224 (Norris, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Planned Parent Ass'n v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1136 (7th
Cir. 1983) (PosnerJ., concurring)). Conversely, there can be no doubt that Madsen
wanted a parking spot. See Madsen, 976 F.2d at 1224 (Norris,J., dissenting) (arguing
that Madsen made it "clear to the University that he wanted free disabled parking").
W Ad. at 1224 (Norris, J., dissenting).
4
48 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
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quest"449 which amounted to "requiring a formal application as
the normal prerequisite for bringing a case to court."450  Yet
neither of these requirements, designed at least in part to ascertain
which plaintiffs show the necessary personal stake,45 ' allows for
the fact that a litigant could show personal stake without satisfying
these formalistic45 2 requirements. It was already explained how
the plaintiffs in Lujan demonstrated evidence of personal stake.
453
Similarly, Madsen showed evidence of personal stake by continually
calling the parking office. Neither litigant, however, was granted
standing.
The Court in Lujan imported the concern of separation of
powers into its constitutional personal stake requirement, thereby
increasing the constitutional minimum.454 However, the separa-
tion of powers issue is not implicated in Madsen to the same extent
that it was implicated in Lujan. Yet the lower court is forced to
deny standing because the court must show deference to Lujan's
"constitutional requirement."455 If the Court in Lujan had specifi-
cally denied standing based on the prudential limitation of separa-
tion of powers, while acknowledging that the plaintiffs satisfied
Article III, then future courts, such as the one in Madsen, could have
used their discretion in considering whether separation of powers
concerns were implicated. If a plaintiff both satisfied the constitu-
tional requirement and did not exacerbate the prudential concerns
explicitly outlined by the Supreme Court, a lower court would have
been able to grant standing.
Indeed if the Lujan Court had properly analyzed the case, the
Court of Appeals would probably have granted standing to Madsen.
The particular factual circumstances of this case present countervail-
449 Madsen, 976 F.2d at 1221.
4 o Id. at 1222.
45 Recall that the requirement of concrete plans in Lujan seems to be related both
to imminence and personal stake. For a discussion of the imminence requirement,
see supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the personal stake
requirement, see supra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
452 It is no coincidence that the dissent in each case refers to the Court's personal
stake requirement as formalistic. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2153 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the Court's requirement of "detailed descriptions of future
conduct" as "formalism"); Madsen, 976 F.2d at 1224 (Norris,J., dissenting) (referring
to the court's application requirement as "formalism" (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992))).
3 See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
4 See supra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
1 Madsen, 976 F.2d at 1222. Madsen cites Lujan when considering the
constitutional standing requirement. See id.
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ing considerations which outweigh the normal separation of powers
concerns. Justice Powell has stated the principle that separation of
powers concerns are minimized when the Court must protect
"minority groups against ... discriminatory government ac-
tion."456 It is certainly conceivable that handicapped citizens are
a minority group which deserve a high level of Court protec-
tion.5 Therefore, separation of powers concerns are greatly
reduced. Madsen, a case involving a handicapped American citizen,
implicates few of the separation of powers concerns seen in
Lujan.45 s Yet the Court's importation of what should be pruden-
tial concerns results in the denial of standing in Madsen.
Snake River Farmers' Association, Inc. v. Department of Labor"9
is another case where Lujan's inclusion of what should be prudential
concerns into the Article III requirement of imminence precludes
lower courts from properly weighing countervailing factors. In
Snake River, the Department of Labor established regulations which
limited the conditions upon which farmers could employ foreign
farmworkers. 411 One of the potential foreign farmworkers who
was in the process of searching for work sued the Department of
Labor, alleging that the Department's burdensome requirement of
a personal reference would cause injurious delays in the process of
finding a job.46 '
The court denied standing, reasoning that "the possibility that
[the plaintiff] might seek ... employment ... was insufficiently
concrete to make his injury from [the delays] 'actual or immi-
' United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell,J., concurring);
see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 894 (discussing the Court's "traditional undemocratic
role of protecting... minorities against impositions of the majority"). Professor
Tribe argues that a grant of standing is advisable when the nature of the injury is
such that "the effective operation of majoritarian processes" is inhibited. TMIBE,supra
note 42, § 3-18, at 129.
4
5
7 See TRIBE, supra note 42, §16-31, at 1595-96 ("[Clourts [have] begun to realize
that.., the disabled have been systematically excluded.... ."); see also School Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284-86 (1987) (granting broad protection to handicapped
individuals).
' Unlike handicapped citizens, it is difficult to view environmental groups as a
minority that need Court protection. Several sources even argue that environmental
groups are quite exploitative. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 8, at 897 (describing courts'
"strict enforcement of the environmental laws" as a sign of class bias); Michael S.
Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 341-42
(1990) (claiming that environmental groups amount "to an environmentalist
enforcement cartel").
" 9 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1993).
4o See id. at 794.
461 See id. at 796.
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nent.' 462 It is likely, however, that the plaintiff would have
satisfied the imminence requirement if not for Lujan. The plaintiff
had a past history of applying for jobs at a frequent pace. There is
no reason to assume that he would not apply again at some time in
the near future. Indeed, the plaintiff's "continued attempts to find
[a] ... job.., put him at a genuine risk of future injury from the
[personal reference] requirements."46
The court could not grant standing, though, since it was
hampered by the fact that "[i]n Lujan, the Supreme Court height-
ened the requirements for finding an injury in fact sufficient for
Article III standing."4' The consequence of this heightening is
that the Snake River court is precluded from weighing the presence
of prudential factors such as internationalism. As was already
explained, Lujan imported the concern of internationalism into the
imminence requirement.465 If Lujan had denied standing due to
international worries by using the prudential barrier, the Snake River
court could have considered the presence or absence of internation-
al worries. In all likelihood, it would have reasoned that interna-
tional concerns would militate toward hearing the case. While a
grant of standing in Lujan could arouse international tensions,466
a grant of standing in Snake River would probably reduce interna-
tional tensions, since it would allow United States employers
potentially to employ foreign workers.467  Nonetheless, Lujan's
heightened imminence requirement prevents the Snake River court
from considering such mitigating factors.
Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v.
District of Columbia 8 is another case affected by Lujan, even
though it had little to do with standing. In KKK, twenty-seven Klan
members paraded in Washington, D.C. from the Washington
Monument to Capitol Hill.4"9 Counter-demonstrators resisted the
members, ruining the march.4 7  The Klan then requested a
permit from the police for a new march. 7 ' The police granted
2 Id. at 797 (quoting Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136).
4 Id. at 799 (Boochever, J., dissenting).4U4 Id.
465See supra notes 313-18 and accompanying text.
4 One of the relevant locations is Sri Lanka. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
467 See Snake River, 9 F.3d at 794 (noting the presence of a foreign plaintiff who
sought employment in the United States).
in 972 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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the permit but limited the location of the parade route.472 The
Klan brought an action for an injunction which would require the
police to allow a march on the preferred location. 4 1 Ultimately,
the District Court granted the injunction.4 74 The defendants
appealed. However, since they "did not seek an emergency appeal,"
the march occurred before appellate review could be granted.7 5
The issue for the circuit court was whether the appeal was moot
because the march had already occurred.4 76
When deciding whether an issue is moot, one criterion advanced
by the Supreme Court to be considered is whether the issue is
"capable of repetition."477 If the issue is capable of repetition, it
is not moot. "By 'capable of repetition' the Supreme Court ...
means 'a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action again.'"
478
It is important to keep in mind that the requirement of "capable
of repetition" has never been limited by the requirement of
imminence. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that an issue
is not moot if the events are "capable of repetition 'at any
time.' 479  The imminence limitation on standing has had no
corollary in the doctrine of mootness. Indeed, the Court "has not
so much as hinted at such a limitation. "48 Therefore, the court
did not dismiss for mootness and ultimately decided that the Klan
would "make its way into the city again" and that the original event
was clearly capable of repetition. 48 ' Even so, the lower court was
quite concerned that Lujan's manipulation of imminence could very
well be transported into mootness. It admitted that it "would not
jump out of [its] chairs in surprise were the Court to say that
'capable of repetition' means imminent repetition. "42 The circuit
47 See id. at 368.
47S See id.
474 See id.475 Id. at 369.
471 See id. Despite the fact that the march already occurred, the litigants brought
the case to appeal because "the Klan and the District want[ed] to bring the merits of
the case to an appellate conclusion." Id.4
7 Id. at 369 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911)).
478 Id. at 371 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per
curiam)).




HOW STANDING HAS FALLEN
court was legitimately concerned that there could be a new
requirement after Lujan. After all, the Court in Lujan did "place[]
great weight" on the requirement of imminence.
4 83
It is still startling, however, that the Court even contemplated
not hearing the case. The fact that "'hardly a week goes by in which
[the Klan] do[es] not conduct a street walk'" suggests an overwhelm-
ing likelihood that the event would be repeated. 84 The court
itself was "confident that eventually [the Klan] [would] make its way
into the city again."485 Prior to Lujan, this would have been a
clear case of a claim that was not moot.486 However, after the
Court in Lujan distorted the imminence requirement for stand-
ing,487 the court in KKK legitimately feared that this increased
imminence requirement would also be applicable to mootness.4 8
Moreover, if the constitutional distortion of Lujan could transcend
standing and reach into mootness, it is plausible that the distortions
in Lujan could reach into other areas of the law as well. 4 9
An explicit separation of constitutional and prudential consider-
ations in Lujan would have eliminated this concern. If the Lujan
Court had imported the prudential concern of internationalism into
its constitutional analysis,49 the constitutional requirement of
imminence would not have been extended to such an unprecedent-
ed and unreasonable level. The requirement of imminence would
have been limited exclusively to the constitutional analysis, thus
eliminating all ambiguity and confusion. If such a distinction had
been made in Lujan, the court in KKK would not have had to
question whether the heightened imminence requirement referred
to mootness. KKK would have been heard on its merits without
hesitation or debate because no international concerns were
implicated.4 9 1 The Lujan Court has extended the constitutional
8 Id.
4'" Id. at 370 (quoting Declaration of Virgil L. Griffin, Imperial Wizard of the Ku
Klux Klan, at 2, 1 4 (Oct. 21, 1990)).495 Id. at 371.
4
1 See id. at 370-71 (discussing previous mootness case law suggesting that the
current dispute would be capable of repetition).
417 See supra notes 309-12 and accompanying text (discussing the discrepancy in
the imminence requirement in Lucas and Lujan).
4 See supra note 482 and accompanying text.4
1
9 See MarshallJ. Breger, Defending Defenders: Remarks on Nichol and Pierce, 42
DUKE L.J. 1202, 1215 (1993) ("It is also conceivable that [Lujan] could lead the court
to rethink the ripeness doctrine .... ").4 o See supra text accompanying notes 313-18 (discussing Lujan's importation of
internationalism into the constitutional discussion).
491 The scheduled Klan march occurred in Washington, D.C. See KKK, 972 F.2d
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requirement by failing to limit its constitutional concerns to the
three-pronged test. Consequently, the extension of the constitution-
al requirement has eliminated much of the lower courts' discretion.
B. Harm to Congress
In addition to the elimination of lower courts' discretion, the
previous case law has also caused considerable damage to the
powers of Congress. When the Court includes what should be
prudential concerns in its constitutional analysis, it takes away
Congress's discretion to weigh countervailing considerations in its
decision-making process. 9 2 Since Congress only has the power to
create standing on prudential grounds, 493 cases which remove
what should be prudential limits and place them into the Article III
analysis greatly restrict congressional power.
The Lujan case exemplifies this problem. When Congress
drafted the ESA, it created a citizen-suit provision which provides
that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf...
to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency... who is alleged to be in
violation [of the act]."494 The purpose of such a provision is to
enable the private sector to help Congress in the enforcement of
environmental laws.4 95 While Congress cannot confer standing
upon a citizen who would otherwise be powerless to sue under
Article III,"' it can use its powers to authorize any litigant who
satisfies the requirements of Article III to bring a suit.4 17  The
citizen-suit provision of the ESA should eliminate any concerns that
should be prudential such as separation of powers or international-
ism. 9 Indeed, both of these concerns are exactly the type of
at 367.
"" For a discussion of why Congress should have the power to make certain broad
decisions, see supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
49 See supra note 25 (explaining that Congress can grant standing only as far as
Article III permits).
4" Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 15 4 0(g) (1988)).
495 See Greve, supra note 458, at 342 (noting that the citizen-suit provision allows
Congress to receive assistance from "private attorneys general").
4' See McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D. Idaho 1981) (noting that
Congress cannot grant standing by a statute that is inconsistent with Article III).4
9 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972)
(explaining that Congress can grant standing as broadly as Article III permits).
4
11 See Bullock, supra note 27, at 615 ("Citizen suit provisions are.., a legislative
overruling of all prudential standing limitations.").
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problem that the citizen-suit provision of the ESA was designed to
remedy.
The citizen-suit provision of the ESA was drafted to eliminate
international concerns. When Congress enacted the ESA, one of its
intentions was to allow suits which addressed agency activity in
foreign nations. Indeed, "the consultation requirements of section
7 [were intended] to apply to federal actions abroad."499 Such an
intention obviates the need for judicial restraint involving interna-
tional concerns. Additionally, the citizen-suit provision of the ESA
eliminates separation of powers concerns as well. It was already
explained how a congressional grant of standing, such as a citizen
suit, alleviates separation of powers worries merely because it is the
majoritarian Congress that is granting standing. 00 When Con-
gress drafted the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, it made a
majoritarian decision to let the countermajoritarian courts resolve
certain matters, thereby mitigating separation of powers con-
cerns.
50 1
When the Court in Lujan, however, dismissed the congressional-
ly authorized citizen-suit due to separation of powers, it denied
Congress its ability to override prudential worries and authorize
standing, despite the fact that a congressional grant of standing
alleviates worries over separation of powers. The Lujan Court
would respond to the argument that it abridged Congress's ability
to grant standing by making two arguments of its own. First, it
would note that it did not abridge congressional power because it
did not deny the citizen suit due to prudential problems but rather
because the plaintiffs did not satisfy the constitutionally mandated
injury requirement, 50 2 a deficiency which even Congress cannot
override. There are two problems with this argument. First, as was
already explained, Lujan imported what should be prudential
worries into its injury analysis, 50 3 preventing Congress from
balancing the prudential worries. Second, it is unclear that
Congress does not have the power to authorize standing even in the
absence of an Article III injury. Although this Comment has
49 Blum, supra note 318, at 141. Blum's article interprets the legislative history
of § 7 in order to show Congress's international intentions.
'o See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
01 See supra note 30 (explaining that citizen-suit provisions mark a congressional
decision to let the courts hear certain cases).
5 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2140 (noting that plaintiffs "fail[ed] to show injury").
Seesupra notes 293-340 and accompanying text (discussingLujan's inclusion of
what should be nonconstitutional concerns into the injury requirement).
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heretofore assumed that Congress cannot extend standing where the
Constitution would have denied it,5" 4 this point is certainly not
universally accepted." 5 One commentator, Dean Nichol, argues
that in Lujan, Justice Scalia "ignored the scholarship of the history
of Article III "5°6 by holding that courts cannot circumvent the
Article Ill injury and act "at the invitation of Congress" to confer
standing.
0 7
Thus, Lujan abridged congressional power either by importing
what should be prudential concerns into Article Ill or by eliminat-
ing Congress's ability to articulate the scope of Article HI. In either
case, the majoritarian Congress was denied its function of using its
lawmaking power to grant standing to litigants. When Lujan
restricted judicial access, it actually "transfer[red] power.., at the
expense-not of the courts-but of Congress, from which that power
originates and emanates."508
' See supra notes 22, 25, 64, 493, 496 and accompanying text (noting that
Congress can extend standing only as far as Article III allows).
" See e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("The actual or threatened
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights,
the invasion of which creates standing.. . .'" (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))); Nichol, supra note 38, at 1152 (explaining that Congress
may statutorily confer standing to individuals who would not otherwise satisfyArticle
III); Sunstein, supra note 63, at 214 (suggesting that there are "no limits on
congressional creation of standing").
"' Nichol, supra note 38, at 1152.
"o" Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2144.
508 Id. at 2158 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Pierce, supra note 48, at 1199
("The majority opinion in [Lujan] transposes a doctrine ofjudicial restraint into a
judicially enforced doctrine of congressional restraint."). The significance of Lujan's
treatment of Congress's citizen-suit provision becomes strikingly apparent when Lujan
isjuxtaposed against earlier cases addressing legislatively conferred citizen standing.
In Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3196 (1987), the Administrator of the EPA sent a letter to the Secretary of State,
indicating that sources in the United States were contributing to an excessive level of
add deposition. The main issue was whether § 115 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7415(a) (1982), legally obligated the Administrator's successors to address the acid
deposition problem. See Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1445. The section requires the
Administrator to address problems if she believes that sources in the United States
are contributing to excessive pollution. See id. The provision does not specifically
mention successors. The court granted standing relying mainly upon the fact the
plaintiffs were suing pursuant to the "citizen-suit" provision of the Clean Air Act. Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982)). While the plaintiffs, several environmental
groups, and American citizens, did satisfy Article III at the time, it is doubtful that
they would satisfy the increased constitutional levels required in Lujan. Indeed, the
plaintiffs' injury was based on "acid deposition, an injury not only majoritarian but
also an injury whose redressability is questionable." Perino, supra note 286, at 170.
It is doubtful that majoritarian injury of questionable redressability would survive
Lujan. Ironically, Justice Scalia wrote both Thomas and Lujan; he has overruled
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Apart from its first argument that it did not abridge Congress's
ability to grant standing because it denied standing due to constitu-
tional obstacles, the Lujan Court would make a second argument
that it did not abridge Congress's ability to grant standing. The
Court would argue that it rightfully denied standing premised upon
the congressionally authorized citizen-suit because even Congress,
despite its automatic mitigation of certain separation of powers
concerns,50 9 nevertheless implicates other separation of powers
concerns when it permits the courts to hear a case at the executive
branch's expense. Congress, by allowing the courts-and not the
executive branch-to hear a case is violating separation of powers
concerns. Yet the Lujan Court, by denying congressionally autho-
rized standing, did not deprive Congress of any powers that
Congress rightfully possessed. In fact, the Court explicitly said that
permitting "Congress to convert.., interest in executive officers'
compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the
courts [would] permit Congress to transfer from the President to
the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty,
to 'take Care that the laws be faithfully executed.' 51 ° Thus, the
Court is claiming that the citizen-suit provision of the ESA is
constitutionally problematic due to a lack of congressional defer-
ence to separation of powers concerns.
There are two problems with this second argument. First, it is
not clear that standing doctrine requires Congress to concern itself
with abrogation of executive duties. As Professor Sunstein
explained in his recent article on Lujan, "the relationship between
standing limits and [executive duty] is at best ambiguous-and in the
end, I believe, nonexistent."51 Sunstein argues further that the
preservation of executive duty "however relevant it may be to many
issues of administrative law, is irrelevant to the question of
standing."" 2 Second, assuming that a congressional grant of
standing was properly denied in Lujan to prevent improper
abridgment of executive power, the case becomes even stronger for
labelling this separation of powers problem as a prudential one. As
explained earlier, the Lujan Court artificially increased the Article
himself.
' See supra notes 500-01 and accompanying text (noting how a congressional
grant of standing alleviates some separation of powers worries).510 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §3).
511 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 213.
512 Id.
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III standing requirements.51 Clearly, separation of powers was
one reason for such an increase. 514 The Court was probably con-
cerned about the decrease in executive power as a result of the
citizen-suit against an executive officer. 515  Many citizen-suit
provisions, however, allow for suit against an executive agency or
against a private offender.516 Suits against an executive agency,
such as Lujan, arguably implicate separation of powers consider-
ations that should be included in the standing analysis. Problems
arise, however, when these same concerns are imported into the
three-pronged constitutional analysis instead of being examined as
part of the flexible prudential analysis. In suits against private
offenders, concerns about separation of powers are greatly de-
creased.517 The Lujan decision, however, prevents courts from
considering such mitigated concerns by placing separation of
powers concerns into the constitutional calculus. As a result of
heightened Article III requirements, courts will not have the
discretion to consider the varying weight of mitigated separation of
powers concerns in citizen-suits against private offenders as
compared to the increased separation of powers issues in citizen-
suits against the government. Lujan increased the constitutional
requirements in both types of suits,5 1 leaving Congress with less
power to grant judicial access-even against private offenders.
The citizen-suit provision of the ESA represents Congress's
ability to overrule hesitations over separation of powers and
internationalism. The main problem is that the Court in Lujan
carried what should be prudential concerns into the Article III
analysis, removing Congress's ability to eliminate these consider-
ations through statute.
s' See supra notes 293-371 and accompanying text.
514 See supra notes 293-302 and accompanying text (discussing how Lujan distorted
Richardson in order to import separation of powers issues into Article III).
515 See supra note 510 and accompanying text.
516 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §6972(a) (1988) ("[Any person may commence a civil action
on his own behalf... against any person... who is alleged to be in violation ... or
... against the Administrator .... ").
517 The separation of powers concern over displacement of executive power is
"entirely inapplicable when the executive is not even a party." Sunstein, supra note
63, at 231 (citation omitted).
518 See id. at 165 ("[T]he decision invalidates the large number of statutes in which
Congress has attempted to use the 'citizen-suit' ... ."). While Lujan does not
explicitly eliminate citizen suits, the increased Article III requirements have the
practical effect of doing so. The heightened constitutional level prevents Congress
from granting standing, even when the previous constitutional level would have been
satisfied.
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C. Harm to the Doctrine
An additional consequence of the Court's distortion of the
constitutional barrier is the harm that it will cause to the doctrine
of standing, compromising predictability and efficiency in Article M
jurisprudence. By including what should be nonconstitutional
concerns in its Article III calculus, the Court makes it virtually
impossible for future courts to ascertain a consistent standard. As
Justice Blackmun stated in dissent, "I have the greatest of sympathy
for the courts across the country that will struggle to understand the
Court's standardless exposition.
" "9
In addition, Lujan's amorphous standing doctrine invites
inefficient expenditure of judicial resources. Superficially, a
standing doctrine such as the one enunciated in Lujan would appear
to increase inefficiency by clearing federal dockets. Indeed, the
Lujan case has "move[d] in ... [the] direction" of such efficien-
cy.52 Nonetheless, the unpredictability of the Lujan decision will
likely give rise to a different set of inefficiencies. Litigators, unable
to predict accurately questions of standing, will create an "enormous
volume of wasteful litigation about problems of standing."521 The
result in Lujan will "invite the very kind of wasteful and expensive
wrangling that the public deplores and that we can ill afford."52 2
Conversely, an analysis that focuses close attention on the
distinction between constitutional and prudential considerations
eliminates much of this unpredictability and inefficiency. If the
Supreme Court were to restrict the constitutional analysis to its
purpose of assuring the zealous advocacy which sharpens issues
before the Court,52 courts would encounter fewer problems
determining which litigants satisfied Article III. All litigants who
demonstrated a redressable injury which promotes zealous advocacy
would overcome the constitutional hurdles. Then, if the Supreme
51
9 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2158 (BlackmunJ., dissenting); see also DAVIS, supra note
6, § 24:1 ("The main failure of the law of standing is ... the inconsistency .... ").
52o Access to Justice, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 5, 1992, at 14. While judicial efficiency may
be an appropriate consideration, a doctrine of standing premised entirely upon
docket-clearing would be unacceptable. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 829-80 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It would be
wholly illegitimate... for this Court to determine that there was nojurisdiction...
simply because the Court thought that there were too many cases in the federal
courts.").
521 DAVIS, supra note 6, § 24:2.
s Richard Lazarus, Narrowed Standing is Harmful, NAT'L L.J.,July 13, 1992, at 15.
s See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
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Court still believed that the case should not be adjudicated based on
prudential notions ofjudicial restraint, it could explicitly announce
this view by pointing to a prudential consideration such as federal-
ism, separation of powers, or internationalism. In the future, courts
could predictably deny standing when such concerns were implicat-
ed.
D. Harm to Plaintiffs
When the Court imports what should be prudential concerns
into Article III, it denies courts and Congress the ability to grant
standing to many proper litigants. After Lujan, it is possible that
plaintiffs who satisfy Article III and do not implicate any prudential
worries will nonetheless be denied access. The greatest conse-
quence of this importation is that plaintiffs may be denied their day
in federal court. From John Madsen 24 to foreign farm-
workers, 525 from postal workers526 to Amy Skilbred, 527 the
Court's distortion of standing doctrine will deprive plaintiffs of
federal judicial justice.
Perhaps the most damaging denial of standing in all these cases
involved Amy Skilbred. Skilbred, a member of Defenders of
Wildlife, brought suit for an injury to her vocational and aesthetic
interests in the preservation of certain endangered species. 28 But
it is difficult to overlook the point that an endangered species's
survival may depend on the outcome of Ms. Skilbred's suit. Because
it is quite clear that environmental beings themselves do not have
standing to bring suit,5 29 their interest in survival rests upon a
524 See Madsen v. Boise State Univ., 976 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1992).
" See Snake River Farmers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 9 F.3d 792, 797
(9th Cir. 1993).52
1 See American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1st Cir.
1992).
527 See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2146.
528 See id. at 2138.
" See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-41 (1972) (holding that the Sierra
Club could not sue on behalf of the environment itself). Renowned commentators
have criticized the rejection of suits on behalf of the environment. See generally
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972) (arguing that the environment itself, ifit suffers
a redressable injury, should have standing to sue). While the Court in Sierra Club
rejected this notion, it did receive some support in dissent: "The critical question of
'standing' would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we ... allowed
environmental issues to be litigated... in the name of the inanimate object about to
be despoiled, defaced, or invaded .... ." Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Professor Stone's proposal, supported by Justice
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grant of standing to plaintiffs like Ms. Skilbred. In effect, the
environment was denied standing as well as Ms. Skilbred. 530 Apart
from damaging Ms. Skilbred, such a decision could irreparably
damage the environment.
Consider the plight of the Asian elephant. The species, now
concentrated primarily in Southeast Asia, is already threatened.51
As part of its annual migration, the elephant travels a route which
includes a stop at the Mahaweli River in Sri Lanka for feeding.
53 2
Without the opportunity to feed at the Mahaweli River, its popula-
tion could be decimated, causing "particularly disastrous"
5 3
results. The Mahaweli project, funded in part by United States'
agencies, will create the Mahaweli Dam." 4 This dam "could have
massive environmental impacts on such an insular ecosystem as the
Mahaweli River system."" 5  The project, if completed, could
Douglas, has never gained majority support, as the following poetic state court
opinion suggests:
We thought that we would never see
A suit to compensate a tree.
A suit whose claim in tort is prest
Upon a mangled tree's behest;
A tree whose battered trunk was prest
Against a Chevy's crumpled crest;
A tree that faces each new day
With bark and limb in disarray;
A tree that may forever bear
A lasting need for tender care.
Flora lovers though we three
We must uphold the court's decree.
Fisher v. Lowe, 333 N.W.2d 67, 67 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (opinion appears in its
entirety).
' Several sources suggest that the Court increases its constitutional requirements
to extreme levels specifically in the area of environmental litigation. See e.g., Lujan,
112 S. Ct. at 2154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for failing to
recognize that "environmental plaintiffs are under no special constitutional standing
disabilities"); Jeanne A. Compitello, Organizational Standing in Environmental
Litigation, 6 TouRo L. REV. 295, 296 (1990) ("[T]here have been too many hurdles
created for those who want to protect the environment.. . ."); Perino, supra note
286, at 179 ("Scalia will ... cut[] back the Court's potentially powerful role in
promoting the environmental agenda."); Robichaud, supra note 60, at 449 (analyzing
the "recent wave of cases denying standing to environmental plaintiffs"); Sunstein,
supra note 63, at 221 (noting that the invalidation of the citizen-suit provisions will be
particularly harmful to environmental laws).
531 See Respondents' Brief at 21, Lujan (No. 90-1424).
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permanently destroy the Asian elephant."' By denying standing
to Defenders of Wildlife, the Court in Lujan may ultimately permit
the extinction of the Asian elephant. Perhaps the famous conserva-
tionist Aldo Leopold best explained the effect of the loss of a
species: "The opportunity to see geese is more important than the
television, and the chance to find a pasque-flower is a right as
inalienable as free speech."
5 3 7
CONCLUSION
It is often true that "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as such."13 1 Yet one standing generalization is
quite worthwhile: "[t]his constitutional-prudential distinction is very
important."5 31 It can make the difference between a grant of
standing and a denial of standing; it can make the difference
between judicial access for a litigant and lack of access for a litigant;
it can make the difference between life and death. The Supreme
Court has distorted the Article III limitations on standing by
importing what should be prudential concerns into its constitutional
analysis. Consequently, courts and Congress will be prevented from
granting standing to zealous advocates who do not implicate
prudential worries. Many deserving plaintiffs will be deprived of
their day in court. Such a denial of standing can have tragic and
irreversible effects. A plaintiff could be denied the chance to
challenge harmful government conduct.5 40 The consequences of
this denial could range from the loss of a parking spot5 41 to the
loss of a son 542 to the loss of an entire species. The stakes are
high. The Supreme Court's muddling of the constitutional and
53 See id.
537 ALDo LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC vii (1949); see also Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751 n.8 (1972) ("'When a species is gone, it is gone forever.
Nature's genetic chain, billions of years in the making, is broken for all time.'"
(quoting CONSERVE-WATER, LAND AND LIFE, Nov. 1971, at 4)).
" Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
... Bullock, supra note 27, at 614.
5 See, e.g., Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2146 (denying standing to challenge governmental
failure to take environmental precautions); EKWRO, 426 U.S. at43 (denying standing
to challenge government subsidies); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 512 (1975)
(denying standing to challenge official discrimination); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
302 U.S. 464, 478 (1938) (denying standing to challenge government competition).
41 See Madsen v. Boise State Univ., 976 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1992).
See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (denying mother of death row
inmate standing to file application for stay of execution).
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prudential concerns has caused this judicial access doctrine to fall.
The proper allocations of these concerns will allow it to stand.

